Religion of peace? Yes, peaceful religion.

“When fascism comes to America, it will be wrapped in the flag and carrying a cross.” Sinclair Lewis (1885 – 1951)

When Noble Prize laureate Sinclair Lewis stated these words little did he know that his words would ring? In all reality history has proven that his quote was some sort of prophecy!!

Now, after about 60 years after Lewis’s death, we are witnessing a new form of fascism trying to storm the American society, announcing itself as a patriotic warrior for security and homeland!!

The Fascism we are discussing does not use weapons however it depends largely on racism against Muslims and Islam which is practiced widely by many influential individuals affecting the American public opinion. A typically racial website called thereligionofpeace.com does not combat terrorism or extremists as alleged but in fact practices animosity to Muslims and Islam.

Although the website attempts to portray itself as rational rejecting all forms of prejudice it has in fact illustrated the complete opposite. Articles published depict Muslims as the enemies and Islam the religion of terrorism

The website controlled by smear casters, mistakenly uses the Islamic sacred texts of the Quran to promote the wrongful ideas they support, by using texts out of context, ultimately changing its meaning.

ROP website also publishes fabricated statistics on the number of terrorism attacks committed by “Muslims” against other religion followers.

The website laces its articles with sarcasm and insinuations playing on the readers emotions where in one instance it posted on its homepage, an article stating that in 2007 Islam and Judaism’s holy holidays overlapped for 10 days asserting that Muslims racked up 397 dead bodies in 94 terror attacks across 10 countries during this time as opposed to the Jews who worked on their 159th Nobel Prize.”

The website portrays to its readers that Muslims loathe Americans since the Americans combat terrorism which symbolizes Islam and now the Muslims will attack Americans. Hence the American citizen who reads that “all Muslims” considers him as an enemy should be killed, won’t wait for his Muslim neighbor to come and kill him. Clearly there is a missing link with true misunderstandings and misgivings

The disagreeable vibes circulating, truly oppose the most basic human rights of freedom of religion, and will ultimately end with crimes committed against Muslims, who are a minority in western countries such as the United States and Britain.

The website fails to assert that each individual has an international and constitutional right to freedom of religion; in fact the very religion they oppose stipulates that a good Muslim should not judge individuals by religion, and Islam is a religion which endorses and advocates peace.

ROP has not only proven that it is aggressive towards western Muslims, the website is also supportive of crimes committed by the Israeli occupation against Palestinians. The website tends to tilt its scales favoring the Israelis it uses double standards in events such as the Israeli military massacre where commandos descended military helicopters boarded the ship and attacked international peace activists, on the Miva Marmara which resulted in 20 deaths and dozens of injuries.

The ROP website shed light on the dead Israelis with no rebuking to the Israelis’ victims both on board and in the Palestinian lands.

In fact the website has demonstrated that it lacks integrity as it continues to distort the truth and aims at constantly tarnishing the image of Muslims and the religion of Islam by posting photos and stories of provoked Muslims without reporting both sides of the story.

This introductory essay is the first of a series that will handle many causes addressed on the ROP website, related to the Islamic centers in the west, in addition to Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood bloc, and many other issues.

All Terrorists are Muslims…Except the 94% that Aren’t

CNN recently published an article entitled Study: Threat of Muslim-American terrorism in U.S. exaggerated; according to a study released by Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “the terrorist threat posed by radicalized Muslim-Americans has been exaggerated.”

Yet, Americans continue to live in mortal fear of radical Islam, a fear propagated and inflamed by right wing Islamophobes.  If one follows the cable news networks, it seems as if all terrorists are Muslims.  It has even become axiomatic in some circles to chant: “Not all Muslims are terrorists, but nearly all terrorists are Muslims.” Muslims and their “leftist dhimmi allies” respond feebly, mentioning Waco as the one counter example, unwittingly affirming the belief that “nearly all terrorists are Muslims.”

But perception is not reality.  The data simply does not support such a hasty conclusion.  On the FBI’s official website, there exists a chronological list of all terrorist attacks committed on U.S. soil from the year 1980 all the way to 2005.  That list can be accessed here (scroll down all the way to the bottom).

Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Soil by Group, From 1980 to 2005, According to FBI Database

According to this data, there were more Jewish acts of terrorism within the United States than Islamic (7% vs 6%).  These radical Jews committed acts of terrorism in the name of their religion.  These were not terrorists who happened to be Jews; rather, they were extremist Jews who committed acts of terrorism based on their religious passions, just like Al-Qaeda and company.

Yet notice the disparity in media coverage between the two.  It would indeed be very interesting to construct a corresponding pie chart that depicted the level of media coverage of each group.  The reason that Muslim apologists and their “leftist dhimmi allies” cannot recall another non-Islamic act of terrorism other than Waco is due to the fact that the media gives menial (if any) coverage to such events.  If a terrorist attack does not fit the “Islam is the perennial and existential threat of our times” narrative, it is simply not paid much attention to, which in a circuitous manner reinforces and “proves” the preconceived narrative.  It is to such an extent that the average American cannot remember any Jewish or Latino terrorist; why should he when he has never even heard of the Jewish Defense League or the Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros?  Surely what he does not know does not exist!

The Islamophobes claim that Islam is intrinsically a terrorist religion.  The proof?  Well, just about every terrorist attack is Islamic, they retort.  Unfortunately for them, that’s not quite true.  More like six percent.  Using their defunct logic, these right wingers ought now to conclude that nearly all acts of terrorism are committed by Latinos (or Jews).  Let them dare say it…they couldn’t; it would be political and social suicide to say such a thing. Most Americans would shut down such talk as bigoted; yet, similar statements continue to be said of Islam, without any repercussions.

The Islamophobes live in a fantasy world where everyone is supposedly too “politically correct” to criticize Islam and Muslims.  Yet, the reality is the exact opposite: you can get away with saying anything against the crescent.  Can you imagine the reaction if I said that Latinos should be profiled because after all they are the ones who commit the most terrorism in the country?  (For the record: I don’t believe in such profiling, because I am–unlike the right wing nutters–a believer in American ideals.)

The moral of the story is that Americans ought to calm down when it comes to Islamic terrorism.  Right wingers always live in mortal fear–or rather, they try to make you feel that way.  In fact, Pamela Geller (the queen of internet Islamophobia) literally said her mission was to “scare the bejeezus outta ya.” Don’t be fooled, and don’t be a wuss.  You don’t live in constant fear of radicalized Latinos (unless you’re Lou Dobbs), even though they commit seven times more acts of terrorism than Muslims in America.  Why then are you wetting yourself over Islamic radicals?  In the words of Cenk Uygur: you’re at a ten when you need to be at a four.  Nobody is saying that Islamic terrorism is not a matter of concern, but it’s grossly exaggerated.

Related Posts:

Europol report: All terrorists are Muslims…Except the 99.6% that aren’t

RAND report: Threat of homegrown jihadism exaggerated, Zero U.S. civilians killed since 9/11

Update:

A reader by the name of Dima added:

The FBI Terrorism Report shows…[that] the highest number of terrorist incidents in the U.S. by region (90) took place in Puerto Rico.

Second Update:

An Islamophobe commented on this article, saying that the statistics are flawed because the FBI included small acts such as “stealing rats from a lab” as an act of terrorism.  Of course, this is patently false.  Here is a breakdown of the terrorist attacks by type (the pie chart is from the FBI’s official website and can be accessed here):

Terrorism by Event, From 1980 to 2005, According to FBI Database

Intellectuals and the Brotherhood phobia..!

Alaa Al-Nadi, Islamonline

Although fears overwhelmed many Egyptian Elites and some people as a result of Muslim Brotherhood group’s rise in the recent parliamentary elections, yet the most who were more panicked and awe-stricken were the intellectual elite; without exaggeration, it became a state of phobia!!

Many people were surprised to find this panicked reaction from intellectuals’ part. The fact is that all expectations and first results for Muslim Brotherhood never expected this smashing success for them to the extent they would be decision –makers in society. Being decision-makers implicates that Brotherhood would interfere in molding the Egyptian social reality in all aspects in accordance with their views and methodologies.

Predictions spike

There could be many interpretations for this overwhelming panic from the intellectuals’ part, perhaps because they shared other elites in predictions for elections. There predictions for Muslim Brotherhood never exceeded the fifty parliamentary seats along with the assertions of Muslim Brotherhood themselves who declared their minor predictions.

When the results of the first electoral phase was declared predictions changed to prospects of winning more than one hundred seats. Intellectuals observed closely that it is shockingly a lack of expectations.

These electoral elections incited a deduction from intellectuals which unmasked their views and blew up their preconceptions for reality and the horizons of the future.

It is evident that this category of society always gambled that there is a big hiatus between the political Islamic project and the possibilities of bringing it into effect. The extensions of hiatus-according to intellectuals- between the political projects for the Islamists and the reality are attributed to the social opposition for this option and not only according to the regime practices against Islamists.

Friends………. But!!

All the results of the electoral process and its repercussions caused much revisionism; as the intellectual elite rather than any elites feel the threat and believe that the objective reality was handed over to the interests of Muslim Brotherhood besides the elections have proved that Muslim Brotherhood have great competitive political qualifications and they can be a fierce rival for the ruling party along with the absence of other parties and powers who showed very weak turn out. This implicates that the distance separating between reality and political Islamic projects narrowed.

This interprets the change in stances for some elite figures who were in good terms with Muslim Brotherhood according to the fact that there is nothing that can spoil relations with Brotherhood as they are still far from decision-making besides there were no predictions that Brotherhood hardly can approach the political domain.

Threats for culture

Among reasons that forced the intellectual elite to form its own stance; their fears about the artistic and cultural production and the threats against it from the part of Islamists who are indulged in the political work through their presence in many representative bodies and associations, like the Parliament. Therefore, it represents a threat as Parliament is the only body concerned with making laws, issuing resolutions and assumes the role of censorship. Accordingly, the intellectual elite are obsessed by the past stances taken by the Islamic trends and their calls to confiscate many cultural and artistic works.

The intellectual elite perhaps have future outlooks about the siege that will enclave culture and arts on the hands of Islamic trend. Since these pressures and confiscations were carried out when the number of Muslim Brotherhood was less than 25%, therefore, the state of siege and pressures will increase since their representation in parliament increased as well.

The great evident writing that reveals such worries and fears was that article by the Egyptian novelist Bahaa Tahir in the “Al-Arabi Al-Nasseri newspaper”. Without any compliments or flattering, Bahaa Tahir describes it as an “upheaval” and the fact lies in the upheaval that occurred in the methods of thinking of the Egyptian citizen. “This change was a planned one and was carried out wittingly and with leisure over three decades. All bewaring voices and warnings were unable to neither stop it nor mobilize powers against its growing threat.”

Bahaa Tahir stroke an example from the past to prove the seriousness of his fears that Muslim Brotherhood representative would use their political posts to increase siege over cultural domains.

He says,” The decision made by Brotherhood representatives concerning the issue of “the three novels” has sparked off a great turmoil, and the result was confiscating these novels from market and sacking the employees who permitted the novels’ publishing.” He added, “I really have serious fears, because those brotherhoods do not intend to appeal before judiciary or any body as they did so before, but the real danger lies in masses who are aside with them also brotherhood might stir masses with fake moral claims to burn books and may be the writers as well.”

Red line Zone

There is a crisis of credibility between cultural elites and Islamists. This relation can be found in all corners of Earth. This is based on the concept of “the red line zone”, according to the attribute by Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. Cultural elite still look upon the thesis of Islamists in this issue as still full of ambiguity because the Islamic pattern that is propounded by Islamic trends is a theocratic pattern which will be based on monopolizing the truth and confiscating the social work.

Although Muslim Brotherhood endeavor continuously to extinguish these fears but many intellectuals still are not convinced. They say that these assertions from brotherhoods are tactful replies and is not based on clear knowledge through which one can feel ease.

Where is the Position of Culture?

If we solved the problematic of religious government then still the problematic of culture as it is. Intellectual elites are trying to prove their truth behind their concerns trough giving examples about their previous experiences especially the clashes among religion, culture and policy. Some regard this point as an exposing one because it shows that Islamists are dealing with culture and arts on textual literary basis that are  bare from any kind of awareness and specialization in this field. This cause the decisions of brother to be based on a policy of abolishment that is full of lurk and confiscation.

Some believe that the political Islamic trend lacks awareness for history. Islamic civilization abounds in many periods where the levels of freedom were very high that allowed bringing forth hot issues no one of Muslim intellects nowadays can never propound it. No body dared at that time to confiscate such works and hinder them.

It is noticeable that recently some statements came from some brotherhood figures pointing to the issues of arts and culture. Despite their response, yet they failed to bridge the hiatus and restore trust. Some observers believed that that is kind of gamble imposed by political and they describe the Brotherhood discourse as in lack for balance between the respect of freedoms, the call for releasing all creative faculties and their discourse about measures which is considered as the “red line zone” that result in confusion and misunderstanding.

At the same time Muslim Brotherhood regard their statements as calling for freedom and expressing familiarity with culture and arts. The scope of measures, as they meant, target only keeping absolutes and decorum. Intellectual elites believe that these statements hide behind a spirit of confiscation and censorship. Intellectuals call for the necessity of releasing freedoms for creativity and inventiveness and the privacy of standardization   measures related to the realm of culture and arts.

Blockage in connectedness

There is a clear state of blockage in connectedness between cultural elites and Muslim Brotherhood. This may be related to the great responsibilities Muslim Brotherhood are assuming besides there are heavy confrontations against them leaving no room to detail their statements in especially what is related to the cultural issue. Noteworthy, Muslim Brotherhood is always surviving under pressures and this justifies their trials to devise some elusive statements in this issue.

Many intellectuals do not believe in these justifications as they interpret the weak connectedness from The Brotherhood part as they have weak cultural background because they are indulged in political and preaching activities. The Brotherhood stance reflects the poor views of the group towards the realm of culture and their weakness in possessing the faculties of connectedness in this vital and important field. This result in a great hiatus and dissention that will pave way in front of stereotyping and the inability to abandon previous views.

From an objective point of view we can say that the views of cultural elites about Muslim Brotherhood abound in exaggeration and extremism in many objective aspects. Without going into the battle of ups and owns between both parties; all related to this issue heralds for a state of phobia from the part of cultural and intellectual elites after the rise of Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time Brotherhood are trying to appease panic and tension. Perhaps this may lead to activating the dialogue between both parties in order to penetrate the taboos between them and deduce points where they can intersect. However, predictions for connectedness seem to be weak, at least on short-term.

Nonie Darwish Caught in a Pool of Lies

We are going to have an explosive breakdown of the clownish Nonie Darwish, another charlatan akin to Wafa Sultan who is milking the Islamophobic cash cow for all it’s worth. Jim Holstun, a professor at SUNY Buffalo wrote this great piece in 2008 that lays bear Nonie’s excessive Islamophobia, as well as her contradictions and lies.

Nonie Darwish and the al-Bureij Massacre

StandWithUs is a Zionist advocacy group in Los Angeles. It concentrates on US colleges and universities, offering fellowships, book donations, lectures, training and hands-on activism. I first heard about the group in 2005, after its Executive Director, Roz Rothstein, wrote my university’s president, provost and Arts and Sciences dean to warn them that I was teaching courses in Palestinian culture. She passed along some hysterical libels from anonymous community members (not my students), gave a detailed critique of my syllabuses, encouraged them to investigate me and two other colleagues, and helpfully suggested a few questions they might want to ask.

StandWithUs manages an impressive stable of Zionist speakers, including several who are Arabs, Muslims, or ex-Muslims: Brigitte Gabriel, Ishmael Khaldi, Walid Shoebat, Khaled Abu Toameh, and Nonie Darwish. Darwish, born an Egyptian Muslim, now an American Evangelical Christian, is one of the most energetic. She manages the website Arabs for Israel and has appeared on FOX News, on the website Frontpage Magazine, and in the film Obsession: Radical Islam’s War Against the West. She is also the author of Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror. Penguin Books publishes it under its Sentinel imprint — a special line of conservative titles. Since her book’s publication in 2006, Darwish has toured extensively, speaking primarily at colleges and universities.

Now They Call Me Infidel has blurbs from all the usual crew: Daniel Pipes, David Horowitz, Robert Spencer, Bat Ye’Or, former Senator Rick Santorum, Representative Tom “Nuke Mecca” Tancredo, and General Paul Vallely, who advocates the final ethnic cleansing of all Palestinian citizens of Israel. In the book itself, Darwish interweaves stories of her Egyptian girlhood with potted accounts of female genital mutilation, arranged marriages, polygamy, veiling, domestic abuse, honor killings, sharia law, jihad, censorship, hate-oriented education, the rejection of modernity, the cult of martyrdom, Islamic imperialism, and the pathological, groundless hatred of Israel.

In her interviews and in her book, she insists that she is not anti-Arab or anti-Islamic, and even suggests from time to time that she is still a Muslim. Then she pivots nimbly and attacks “the Arab mind,” “the seething Arab street,” and “the Muslim world,” with its “culture of jihad,” “culture of death,” and “culture of envy.” There are “no real distinctions between moderate or radical Muslims,” and no significant differences within or among Arab or Muslim cultures: for Darwish, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s secular Arab nationalism was essentially jihadist. Darwish is allergic to social history: “I realized that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not a crisis over land, but a crisis of hate, lack of compassion, ingratitude, and insecurity.” Instead of history, scholarship, and footnotes, she gives us a watered-down version of Raphael Patai’s The Arab Mind: a dictionary of Islamophobic commonplaces underwritten by the authority of an ex-Muslim native informant: I was there — I know.

Darwish’s portraits of Israel and of the US, to which she emigrated in 1978, are diametrically opposite but equally fatuous: Israeli Jews are tolerant, pragmatic, and peace-loving. From 1967 to 1982, they made the Sinai bloom. Americans are honest, charitable, industrious, self-sufficient, intellectually curious, and benevolent toward the foreign nations to whom they bring liberty. They err only in their excess of credulous goodness: because of “the simplicity of American values such as truthfulness,” they risk falling prey to duplicitous jihadist immigrants and dangerous professors, who “indoctrinate American young people with the radical Muslim agenda.”

Her outsider’s view of America complements her insider’s view of the Arab and Muslim world, for imperial states want not only other people’s land and labor, but their love. Here, we may compare Now They Call Me Infidel not only to recent anti-Islamic conversion narratives like Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s Infidel (her conversion was to neoconservative atheism and the American Enterprise Institute), but to earlier works in the genre. In her 1964 Editions Gallimard autobiography, O mes soeurs musulmanes, pleurez! (O My Muslim Sisters, Weep!), Zoubeida Bittari recounts her escape from Algerian Muslim patriarchy to French Christian bliss as a domestic servant to a Pied-Noir family; Nonie Darwish finds friends, family, and faith in southern California, including a Republican women’s group, an American husband, and Christian fellowship in Pastor Dudley Rutherford’s Shepherd of the Hills Church. As Bittari helped French colons feel better about their ungratefully rebuffed civilizing mission in Algeria, so Darwish helps Americans feel better about the long and bumpy road to global democratization.

There are occasional flashes of something more individual and authentic in Darwish’s book. For instance, her reiterated heartfelt attack on Nasser’s rent control laws (her mother lived partly off of her Cairo rentals) helps us understand why she feels so much more at home in southern California, where she arrived with enough money to buy a house with a swimming pool. But as a whole, the book is tedious, predictable, and badly edited — born to be bought, scanned and displayed, not actually read. But this will not diminish the demand for Darwish as a lecturer, which derives not from her writing but from her parentage: her father was Colonel Mustafa Hafez, head of Egyptian army intelligence in the Gaza Strip in the early ’50s, who was killed by an Israeli letter bomb in July 1956. Every lecture notice, every interview, even the title page of her book announces her as “a Muslim Shahid’s Daughter.”

Throughout her book, Darwish struggles to maintain love and loyalty both to the father she lost at age eight and to the Israeli state that killed him. In a parting flourish, she says that “My father — and potentially my whole family — was sent to his death in Gaza by Nasser, who was consumed by his desire to destroy Israel,” and she fondly imagines him surviving and flying with assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Israel. But this argument sometimes requires a torturous chronology: “When, on January 16, 1956, Nasser vowed a renewed offensive to destroy Israel, the pressure on my father to step up operations increased. More fedayeen groups were organized, and their training expanded to other areas of the Gaza Strip. Often my father was gone for days at a time. In an attempt to end the terror, Israel sent its commandos one night to our heavily guarded home.”

The problem here is that this early, failed assassination attempt occurred in 1953, when Hafez was struggling to prevent destabilizing Palestinian infiltration from Gaza into Israel. Things changed dramatically in February 1955, when then military commander Ariel Sharon’s Gaza raid killed 37 Egyptian soldiers and wounded 31. This raid brought shocked international condemnation, the end of Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett’s ongoing negotiations with Nasser, mass demonstrations of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, and Nasser’s decision to have Hafez organize and arm Palestinian fedayeen for cross-border forays. Israeli historians Avi Shlaim and Benny Morris see the raid as a turning point in Israeli-Arab relations. Darwish never mentions it.

Continuing with her discussion of the earlier undated raid on her family’s home (it actually occurred on 28-29 August 1953), she says, “My father was not at home that night, and the Israelis found only women and children — my mother, two maids, and five small children. The commandos left us unharmed. I personally did not even wake up or know of the incident until later in life, when I read a book written about my father. After I read it, I called my mother immediately, and she confirmed the story. The Israelis chose not [to] kill us even though the Egyptian-organized fedayeen did kill Israeli civilians, women and children.”

Young Nonie must have been a very sound sleeper, since one squad blew the gate off her house, injuring several civilians, and, by one account, proceeded to demolish the house. Grown-up Nonie seems not to know that the Israeli commandos were part of Ariel Sharon’s newly-organized Unit 101. While the one squad attacked her house, Sharon’s was cornered nearby in al-Bureij refugee camp. He decided they would bomb and shoot their way through the camp rather than retreat from it. General Vagn Bennike, the Danish UN Truce Chief, reported to the Security Council on the ensuing massacre: “Bombs were thrown through the windows of huts in which the refugees were sleeping and, as they fled, they were attacked by small arms and automatic weapons. The casualties were 20 killed, 27 seriously wounded, and 35 less seriously wounded.” Other sources estimate from 15 to 50 fatalities.

The Israeli army blamed the raid on rogue kibbutzniks, and Ariel Sharon tried to reassure his men, telling them that all the dead women were camp whores or murderous Palestinian infiltrators. But some of them remained shocked at what they had done. Participant Meir Barbut said they felt as if they were slaughtering the pathetic inhabitants of a Jewish transit camp: “The boys threw Molotov cocktails at [innocent] people, not at the saboteurs we had come to punish. It was shameful for the 101 and the IDF [Israel army].” Another asked, “Is this screaming, whimpering multitude … the enemy? … How did these fellahin sin against us?” In 2006, Palestinian journalist Laila El-Haddad interviewed a survivor for Al Jazeera English:

“Mohammad Nabahini, 55, was two at the time and lived in the camp. He survived the attack in the arms of his slain mother. ‘My father decided to stay behind when they attacked. He hid in a pile of firewood and pleaded with my mother to stay with him. She was too afraid, and fled with hundreds of others, only to return to take me and a few of her belongings with her,’ he said. ‘As she was escaping, her dress got caught in a fence around the camp, just over there,’ he gestured, near a field now covered with olive trees. ‘And then they threw a bomb at her, Sharon and his men. She tossed me on the ground behind her before she died.’”

Though Darwish never mentions it, the al-Bureij Massacre hasn’t exactly been a secret — both Zionist and anti-Zionist historians have described it clearly, with little disagreement save the number of fatalities, with the high-end estimate coming from an Israeli history. If it tends not to loom large in Palestinian historical memory, that’s because it was overshadowed just two months later by the Qibya Massacre, during which Sharon’s Unit 101 killed 67, women and children, demolishing buildings over their heads and shooting them down when they tried to flee — the tactic pioneered at al-Bureij. Given its propensity for civilian soft targets, this daredevil elite unit might be better described as a death squad.

We probably shouldn’t expect Nonie Darwish to alter her campus presentations anytime soon. The bookings by StandWithUs might dry up if she were to start supplementing her cautionary tales about sharia law, jihadi immigrants, and female genital mutilation with a serious discussion of Israeli massacres at Deir Yassin, Tantura, al-Bureij, Qibya, Kfar Qasim, Sabra and Shatila, and Beit Hanoun. In any case, Darwish prefers simple cultural generalities and intimate personal reflection to historical analysis. But since that’s the case, someone at her next lecture might ask if she remembers playing with any of the refugee children murdered at al-Bureij, and why the kindly Israeli commandos who spared her family decided to blow up Mohammad Nabahini’s mother.

Jim Holstun teaches world literature and Marxism at SUNY Buffalo and can be reached at jamesholstun A T hotmail D O T com.

Tawfik Hamid: The Shemp of the Three Stooges

Source: LoonWarch.com

In one of our earliest features we wrote about the Three Stooges of Islamophobia: Walid Shoebat, Zachariah Anani and Kamal Saleem who represent Larry, Curly, and Mo, but in the same way as there is Shemp, there is also Tawfik Hamid.

Tawfik Hamid, like his counterparts, describes himself as an “ex-terrorist” but as we will come to see his claims are as vacuous and silly as the other three.  The difference between the other three and Tawfik Hamid is that the other three claim to be converts to Evangelical Christianity while Hamid vacillates between claiming to be not only a Muslim and an Islamic Reformer but also a follower of Judaism and Christianity and in other instances a non religious person.

In 2007, Hamid served as a keynote speaker for the neo-Conservative  Intelligence Summit and now sits on their advisory board. Amongst the other speakers at the summit, such as Steven Emerson, Joe Kaufman, Nonie Darwish and Walid Phares, there was David Gaubatz, a white supremacist, who led the now defunct Mapping Sharia project (under the tutelage of Society of Americans for National Existence or SANE) which stated that Black people are predisposed to violence,

Is there something unique about the Black American…that leads him to murder so disproportionately and to most often kill and victimize his own? Do we see patterns of Black culture that arise out of Africa and the wanton murder of blacks by blacks there? Why have the colonized blacks of the African continent, after having acquired their freedom and independence, so willingly slaughtered their own and live in despicable disease and squalor despite a land of enormous riches while Indians of the Indian sub-continent have successfully moved from British rule to democracy and relative civility even in a country that still maintains social inequalities as a fact of their culture?

Gaubatz, in 2007, was a leading member of SANE which declared on its now password protected site that, “adherence to Islam as a Muslim is prima facie evidence of an act in support of the overthrow of the US.” It wants the government to ban adherence to Islam and put Muslims under surveillance as stated in its rules, “It shall be a felony punishable by 20 years in prison to knowingly act in furtherance of, or to support the, adherence to Islam.”

If this sounds unbelievably deranged, that’s because it is. We don’t make these facts up. Why would any sane, normal Muslim let alone Muslim reformer as Tawfik proclaims himself to be — speak at a hostile summit in which one of the participants wants to ban him from practicing his faith and make it a punishable offense? One answer is that Tawfik isn’t a Muslim and in fact hates Islam and Muslims which would also mean he is a charlatan. The other answer, which is related to the first, is that this is just part of the strange and twisted world that is produced when those chasing the Islamophobic cash cow converge together and let their strange and contradictory pathologies manifest like an insane asylum having a picnic (apologies to insane asylum’s).

Hamid says that he is a former member of the terrorist organization GI (Gamaa’ Islamiyya) and was a friend of Ayman Al-Zawahri, the number two man in Al-Qaeda. A claim that is not corroborated by any independent sources or governmental law agency. Again the million dollar question is, If this guy is a former terrorist then why aren’t the CIA and FBI all over this guy, watching his movements and interrogating him? Wouldn’t it be a point of interest for our government that someone who was a friend of Ayman Al-Zawahari, the number two of Al-Qaeda, the organization that attacked us on 9/11 is roaming around the country giving speeches? Either Tawfik is lying or our government has missed a big one.

On his new website, Tawfik identifies himself as “a Muslim by faith…Christian by the Spirit…a Jew by heart…and above all I am a human being.” This is a sharp departure from his previous statements in which he stated, “I am a Muslim by birth, a Christian by spirit, a Jew by heart, and above all I am a human being.” Someone must have told Tawfik that it might help his claim to be a “Muslim reformer” if he actually claims Islam as his “faith” instead of just something he was “born” into.

Richard Silverstein, who runs Tikun Olam, did a piece on Hamid after getting an email from Walid Shoebat’s list-serve that Tawfik Hamid would be speaking at Georgetown University. In it he devastatingly highlights the contradictions as well as obvious hate that Tawfik Hamid has for Islam and Muslims.

In Richard’s piece we also see a description of Tawfik on Shoebat’s website that is not there anymore. Notice the similarities between the biographies of Tawfik and Walid,

Here’s what Shoebat’s website tells you about Hamid:

Born in Egypt to a secular Muslim family. At the age of 16 young Hamid started to search for answers to the universal questions about creation and life’s meaning.

Later on, Tawfik started to read the bible as an attempt to criticise it in the ongoing religious debates between Muslims and Christians, but ended up studying the Bible with increased vigour and genuine interest.

If you compare that last paragraph to Shoebat’s own biography at the same site you have to wonder whether a single person is writing their ad copy:

Walid studied the Tanach (Jewish Bible) in a challenge to convert his wife to Islam. Six months later, after intense study, Walid realized that everything he had been taught about Jews was a lie. Convinced he was on the side of evil, he became an advocate for his former enemy.

It seems that these two “ex-terrorists” weren’t creative enough to come up with differing stories and instead didn’t think anyone would see the similarities in their testimonials. As Richard wrote, “you have to wonder whether a single person is writing their ad copy.”

Tawfik Hamid at the time of Richard’s article was charging $13, 500 for “speaking out against Islamic Fundamentalism that prevails in the world today.”

Yet it seems that Tawfik like his Christian Zionist counterparts doesn’t stop at speaking out against Islamic Fundamentalism but instead also speaks out against mainstream Muslims. For instance on the Orla Barry Radio Show he stated that,

There are different degrees of evil [within Islam]. Jemaah Islamiya represents the active evil or active terrorists let us call them who are ready to commit violent acts and all such atrocities. But the majority of Muslim are all passive terrorists. They believe in this evil. They support it either by money or emotionally they are not against it.

According to Tawfik the majority of Muslims are what he terms passive terrorists. This reveals a great contempt for Muslims who he views as nothing more than terrorists in one form or another. For him most Muslims are not law abiding individuals and even if they don’t commit violence or preach it then secretly they are still terrorists. This trope that is used by Islamophobes pretty much assumes Muslims are all guilty before proven innocent and that they are inherently violent.

Tawfik’s bumbling and inconsistent story in which at times he is a Muslim reformer, at other times a Muslim only by birth, then a Christian and a Jew or his declarations that most of his coreligionists are passive terrorists, his sharing the stage with white supremacists and well known Islamophobes and becoming a member of their advisory council is hard to follow let alone comprehend. It is contradictory and as we see quite lucrative — he fits in perfectly as Shemp to the Larry, Curly and Mo of Islamophobia.

The Three Stooges Coming to a Campus Near You!

Source: LoonWatch.com

If you live near to, or are a student at a university you might be interested in knowing that the Three Stooges are touring college campuses nationwide, but before you get your hopes up just know that it’s not the three stooges that you might be familiar with.

We’re talking about the three stooges of the Christian Right: Walid Shoebat, Kamal Saleem and Zachariah Anani.

These three aren’t comedic geniuses in the usual sense but rather are funny in the same way that televangelists who steal money from gullible viewers searching for a cure to their ills give you fits of laughter while at the same time making you feel sick to your stomach. You know its a charade, a concocted myth but you watch to see the theatrics of the show and the usual ‘planted’ caller who declares how the televangelist’s powers cured them of their incurable disease.

So now we have another group of individuals using and abusing Christianity in the name of profit. Former New York Times Middle East Bureau Chief and expert on Christian Fundamentalism Chris Hedges describes them to a tee:

These self-described former Muslim terrorists are regularly trotted out at Christian colleges—a few days ago they were at the Air Force Academy—to spew racist filth about Islam on behalf of groups such as Focus on the Family. It is a clever tactic. Curly, Larry and Mo, who all say they are born-again Christians, engage in hate speech and assure us it comes from personal experience. They tell their audiences that the only way to deal with one-fifth of the world’s population is by converting or eradicating all Muslims.Their cant is broadcast regularly on Fox News, including the Bill O’Reilly and Neil Cavuto shows, as well as on numerous Christian radio and television programs. Shoebat, who has written a book called “Why We Want to Kill You,” promises in his lectures to explain the numerous similarities between radical Muslims and the Nazis, how “Muslim terrorists” invaded America 30 years ago and how “perseverance, recruitment and hate” have fueled attacks by Muslims. (emphasis added)

In fact their tour isn’t simply limited to Christian colleges but extends to colleges and universities that have no affiliation with religion. As noted above they have spoken at the Air Force Academy and most recently (minus Anani) at Western Michigan University.

The fundamentally obvious question that seems to escape people is, “If these guys really are ‘ex-terrorists’ why are they allowed to roam free, campus to campus, lecture hall to lecture hall without being monitored or questioned by the FBI?” The logic of a lot of their supporters in answering this concludes that: if a terrorist repents and accepts Christianity they should be spared prosecution for any crimes committed beforehand.

The looniness in the case of these stooges doesn’t require a great deal of research but can be gleaned from their own words as the best material for their hilarity comes from their own mouths.

For instance, Zachariah Anani claim’s in his biography posted on Shoebat’s hate-site that:

“Every time I killed someone and two or three fighters witnessed it, they would give me a point on my chart. I carried 223 points.”Even his comrades feared him. “Although we had a sense of loyalty to each other,” he says, “we were ready to take out enemies or friends.” When a fanatical Muslim joined his regiment and began knocking on doors to wake the others for prayer at 3 A.M., Anani warned him: “I don’t want to pray. Don’t come and wake me.” When he heard the knock early the next morning, Anani picked up his gun, shot him, and went back to sleep.

LoonWatchers, we can’t make this stuff up!

According to his own admission he has killed at least 223 people and that’s only in those cases in which there were two or three witnesses. You’d think the FBI, CIA and Homeland Security would be all over this murderer but no one knows who he is or what he’s talking about. Also, what kind of insane and pathological individual non-chalantly shoots someone and then simply goes back to sleep; Anani it seems!

The other two stooges are just as bad if not worse in attempting to sell their outlandish and fantastical stories.

Kamal Saleem and Walid Shoebat

Kamal Saleem claim’s to be the descendant of someone called the “The Grand Wazir of Islam,” which  Hedges points out is ”a title and a position that do not exist in the Arab world.” It can be further noted that the religion of Islam has no clerical hierarchy similar to the Catholic Church with defined positions such as the Pope, Bishops, Priests, etc. Kamal’s blooper in his bio is either a result of an ignorance of Islam and its structure or an attempt to manipulate the ignorance of his audience.

Shoebat may be the most outlandish of them all, he is also the most well known. He has in the past equated Islam with “Satanism” and “Nazism.” He also stated in front of an audience at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee that ”Palestinians keep Jewish testicles and breasts in jars.”

He claim’s to have planted a bomb at Bank Leumi in Bethlehem but his story has been debunked by several sources including the Jerusalem Post and Shoebat’s own family members. Bank Leumi itself states that they have no record of a bomb attack for the time period asserted by Shoebat.

Simon Altaf, a former Muslim and a convert to Christianity was a close friend of Shoebat and along with him co-authored a book titled This is our Eden, This is our End. Altaf states that,

Walid wanted to be an ex-Terrorist to make money, pure and simple.

In the end the goal is to make money off of these speaking engagements, television appearances, and Church gatherings. This is an easy sell, after 9/11 many Americans were rightly afraid of another terrorist attack;  in this climate Anti-Muslim and Islamophobic sentiment grew making it a ripe time for someone to capitalize on the growing fear and paranoia in the country.

These three stooges hit on the jack pot and saw that there was a cottage industry developing to bash Muslims and Islam and so jumped on the bandwagon, taking their loony lies and hate-caravan all the way to the bank.

Wafa Sultan: A Poseur Playing off of Ignorance to Further Hate

Source: LoonWatch.com

We must begin this profile with a question: Is there a more contemptible poseur than Wafa Sultan who calls herself an atheist but in the same breath also claims to be a Muslim reformer, which would kind of be like Christopher Hitchens calling himself a Christian reformer? It is difficult to answer that question with certainty considering the wide pool of bigots who combine charlatanism with raving and incorrigible insanity. But for sure one thing is certain, she is completely undeserving of the 15 minutes of fame she has succeeded in procuring.

In this sense, Wafa Sultan falls into the same category as Walid Shoebat, Brigitte Gabriel, Nonie Darwish, Kamal Saleem, Zachariah Anani and other self-proclaimed turn coats from their Arab and Muslim identities. As we mentioned before this group attempts to parlay their “otherness,” and so-called “insider knowledge of the Muslim world,” (the “I’ve been there, I know” line) into a cash cow. Meanwhile, we are supposed to be duped into freaking out and running back to them for more “expert” advice brought to us from our loyal friend who ventures into the other side on our behalf.

Sultan is no different, her tale of flight into Islamophobic stardom is a curious and thoroughly modern one. In the beginning of this tale Sultan was invited onto a show hosted by the well known anchorman of AlJazeera’s Opposing Viewpoints (Ittijaah al-Mu’aakas), Faisal Al-Qasim for the purpose of a debate with professor Ibrahim al-Khouly from Al-Azhar on the topic of the Clash of Civilizations and the Clash of Religions. Al-Qasim, brought her onto the show originally after noticing some of her articles on the Arabic website called AnNaqed (The Critic). The New York Times reported that the website was an Islamic reform site, but in actuality it turns out that it is a Christian website,

[T]he web site called Annaqed (www.annaqed.com) she supposedly wrote for before being noticed by Al-Jazeera Television is not an “Islamic reform Web Site” as was reported in the New York Times article, but rather an Arab nationalist blog run by a Syrian Christian who defines it as being “in line with Christian morality and principles.” The site is also replete with anti-Muslim writings.

On the show she supported the thesis of a clash and stated that the conflict between the West and Islam is,

a clash between a mentality that belongs to the Middle Ages and another that belongs to the 21st century… a clash between civilization and backwardness, between the civilized and the primitive, between barbarity and rationality.

MEMRI, (Middle East Media Research Institute) which peddles in biased, selective, de-contextualized, error-filled, and misleading translations of news, shows and opinion from Middle East television took the 45 minute show and per its modus operandi chopped up and edited the show into a 5 minute sound bite of Wafa Sultan’s attack on Muslims and Islam. In the process, and without any respect for translational integrity they also attempted to deceptively frame Professor Khouly as proclaiming Sultan a “heretic,” when, as this fully translated transcript shows he did no such thing. Instead Khouly responded to Sultan’s jibes with questions that though we might not agree to the way he frames them are far from irrational or undebatable,

…here we must ask a question, who facilitated the conflict and indeed initiated it; is it the Muslims? Muslims now are in a defensive position fighting off an aggressor… who said Muslims were backward? They may be backward in terms of technological advances, but who said that such are the criteria for humanity?

That is just the beginning of the story, the MEMRI produced video was downloaded to YouTube where it went viral receiving over a million hits and like wild fire the anti-Muslim blogosphere picked it up. Instantly, over night, Sultan was a star. In this consumer age, MEMRI’s rendition of the show gave the public what it wanted to see: a spectacle. It fit in well with the narrative of an oppressed Mooslim woman “finally” standing up for her rights and taking on the world of Islam.

Sultan capitalized on the spotlight she had and with all the ingenuity and creativeness of a con-artist spun a tale which essentially boils down to her “dark days growing up in the barbaric ‘Islamic nation’ of Syria.” A good example of her deception can be gleaned from a recent article she wrote for the neo-conservative website Hudson New York,

As an Arab woman who suffered for three decades living under Islamic Sharia, it is clear to me that Islam’s political ideology and Sharia must be fought relentlessly by Western civilization to prevent its application in a free society. (emphasis added)

This encapsulates the opportunism that motivates Sultan and it also reveals the contempt with which she holds her readers whose intelligence she seeks to insult with such a blatant lie. She attempts to paint her three decades in Syria as a nightmare in which she suffered the brutal force of a Taliban-esque regime that implemented Islamic law on her constantly. The absurdity is only matched by the bravado of her claim, as anyone who cared to check (Wikipidea for instance) could tell you that the regime that ruled Syria had nothing to do with Islam.

The regime in Syria, during much of the time period that Sultan talks about was ruled by the secular, anti-Shariah Ba’athist dictator Hafiz al-Assad who happens to come from the same privileged sect that Sultan was born into: the Alawies. Her allegation is even more obscene considering the fact that Hafiz al-Assad massacred 20,000 villagers in Hama, Syria who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. One has to ask Sultan, if you were made to suffer for thirty years under Islamic Sharia’, how could you, a woman, have finished your medicine degree at the University of Aleppo? On top of that, would an Islamic Sharia state as horrid as you describe have funded your education for free?

Another good example of her tale of woe is the profile carried by self-described “bad girl of Islam” Asra Nomani in TIME magazine. Asra Nomani, who can’t pen anything without including herself writes,

I connected with her (Sultan’s) anger and pain. She questioned Islam in 1979, when, she says, she witnessed the murder of a professor by men with alleged ties to the ultraconservative Muslim Brotherhood political group.

As to the claim that her professor (thought to be Yusef Al-Yusef) was gunned down before her eyes in a faculty classroom at the University of Aleppo, Halabi said the incident never took place. “There was a professor who was killed around 1979, that is true, but it was off-campus and Sultan was not even around when it happened,” he added.

InFocus contacted the University of Aleppo and spoke to Dr. Riyad Asfari, Dean of the Faculty of Medicine, who confirmed Halabi’s account. “Yes, the assassination took place off-campus,” he said. Dr. Asfari was keen to add that no one had ever been killed in a classroom anytime or anywhere at the university.

Syrian expatriate Ghada Moezzin, who attended the University of Aleppo in 1979 as a sophomore, told InFocus that she never heard of the assassination. “We would’ve known about the killing if it had happened,” she said. “It would have been big news on campus and I do not recall ever hearing about it.” Moezzin, who lives in Glendora, Calif., added that government security was always present around the university given the political climate in Syria at the time.

Half-truths and lies corroborate and reveal the true motive behind Sultan’s hate and invective against Islam: money. The article reveals more,

Adnan Halabi*, a Syrian expatriate who met and got to know the Sultans when they first came to the United States, spoke at length about the Wafa Sultan that very few people know.

According to Halabi, Dr. Wafa Ahmad (her maiden name) arrived in California with her husband Moufid (now changed to David) in the late 80s on a tourist visa. Contrary to what she told the New York Times, they came as a couple, leaving their two children back in Syria.

Another source named Nabil Mustafa, also Syrian, told InFocus that he was introduced to Moufid Sultan through a personal friend who knew the family well, and both ended up having tea at the Sultans’ one-bedroom apartment one evening in 1989. It was then that Moufid told Mustafa the story of how he was reunited with his two children. According to Mustafa, Moufid Sultan told him that a short time after they arrived in the country, his wife, Dr. Wafa Sultan, mailed her passport back to her sister Ilham Ahmad in Syria (while the passport still carried a valid U.S. tourist visa). With Ilham bearing a resemblance to her sister Wafa, the plan was to go to the Mexican Embassy in Damascus and obtain a visa to Mexico, making sure that the airline carrier they would book a flight on would have a layover somewhere in the Continental United States.

With an existing U.S. visa on Wafa Sultan’s passport, Ilham Ahmad had no trouble obtaining an entry permit to Mexico. Shortly after, Ilham and Wafa’s two children landed in Houston, Texas. She and the children then allegedly made their way through customs and were picked up by Moufid and brought to California.

Taking advantage of an amnesty law for farmers, the Sultans applied for permanent residency through a Mexican lady who worked as a farm hand. She helped Moufid with the paperwork by claiming he had worked as a farmer for four years. The application went through and the Sultans obtained their green cards.

As incredible as the story sounds, Mustafa told InFocus that to the best of his recollection, this was the exact account he heard from Moufid Sultan. Halabi, who is not acquainted with Mustafa, corroborated the story, which he heard from Dr. Wafa Sultan herself but with fewer details. Dr. Wafa Sultan declined InFocus’ repeated requests to be interviewed or comment on the allegations. InFocus contacted the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to check on the veracity of the story but an official said that they would look into the allegations, which could take months to investigate.

Halabi alleges that Ilham Ahmad lived as illegal resident with her sister Wafa for years until she met an Arab Christian named Khalid Musa Shihadeh whom she ended up marrying (they were married in Nevada on 12/8/1991 and filed for divorce in 2002). It was during that time that Halabi got to know the Sultans well.

Halabi alleges that the Sultans lived in dire poverty. “Their rent was over $1,000 per month and Moufid was only making $800,” he said. Dr. Wafa Sultan was forced to rent out a room in her apartment and work at a pizza parlor in Norwalk, Calif. where a personal friend used to pick her up and drop her off daily. This same friend used to help the Sultans out with groceries and occasionally loaned them money just so they could make it through the month. “It was a serious struggle,” Halabi recalled. “The Sultans lived hand to mouth for years on end.” Further, Halabi said that at no point during the period he knew the family did Sultan ever discuss religion, politics or any topic relevant to her current activities. “She is a smart woman, articulate and forceful, but she never meddled in religion or politics to the extent she is doing now,” Halabi said.

Sultan is not condemned only by Muslims, non-Muslims have come out and strongly condemned her as well.

Sultan’s detractors include not only Muslims but members of the Jewish community as well. In an op-ed piece published in the Los Angeles Times (June 25, 2006) and titled “Islam’s Ann Coulter,” Rabbi Stephen Julius Stein at Wilshire Boulevard Temple, who attended a fundraiser for a local Jewish organization where Sultan was a speaker, wrote, “The more Sultan talked, the more evident it became that progress in the Muslim world was not her interest…. She never alluded to any healthy, peaceful Islamic alternative.”

The rabbi mentioned that Judea Pearl, father of murdered journalist Daniel Pearl, “was one of the few voices of restraint and nuance heard that afternoon. In response to Sultan’s assertion that the Koran contains only verses of evil and domination, Pearl said he understood the book also included ‘verses of peace’ that proponents of Islam uphold as the religion’s true intent. The Koran’s verses on war and brutality, Pearl contended, were ‘cultural baggage,’ as are similar verses in the Torah.”

He added, “Sultan’s over-the-top, indefensible remarks at the fundraiser, along with her failure to mention the important, continuing efforts of the Islamic Center (of Southern California), insulted all Muslims and Jews in L.A. and throughout the nation who are trying to bridge the cultural gap between the two groups. And that’s one reason why I eventually walked out of the event.”

The hope is that more and more people like Rabbi Stephen Stein will see Wafa Sultan for who she is: a hateful, opportunistic poseur. The atheist who calls Islam and Muslims “backward and primitive,” “incapable of reform,” the Qur’an as only filled with “evil,” yet can’t see the self-contradiction in her befuddling statements that growing up in secular Syria she “suffered from Islamic Shariah” and “I even don’t believe in Islam, but I am a Muslim.” Go figure.

UPDATE: In retrospect, our piece on Wafa Sultan seems not to have been harsh enough on her hate. In light of recent comments she has made while on her book tour at synagogues and churches, the poseur can properly be renamed, Wafa Stalin Sultan because the atheism that she believes in is propelled by the same genocidal and insane impulses that led another loon, Joseph Stalin.

Atlas Shrugs (read: Pamela Geller on Drugs) made our jobs easy by posting a video clip of Wafa Stalin Sultan going off the deep end. In the video, Sultan is addressing a group at a synagogue in NYC and says,

“I believe King Abdullah can change Islam overnight, but you need to put pressure on him to do it, and the same kind of pressure you put on Japan, you might need it” at that moment someone from the audience interjects and asks, “atom bombs?” Wafa Sultan replies, “Yes. At some point the West will need to do it.” At the end of her speech, she utters something quite strange for an atheist, “God bless you and God bless America.” More charlatanism?

During the question and answer session she divides moderate Muslims into three categories: 1.) a majority, 80% who are unaware of the real teachings of Islam, 2.) huge chunks of them are practicing Taqiyyah, 3.) a very small progressive group who have no effect. All talking points from the far right-wing wing.

The rest of the question and answer session is interesting as well, and pocked full of more and more lies from Wafa Stalin Sultan. Check it out for yourselves.

This disgusting little woman continues with her fascist fearmongering, she says, “Islam is infiltrating and you are doing nothing about it.” Someone from the audience then asks Sultan, “How would we stop it from infiltrating?” Sultan replies, “Get involved in politics, you have to know the kind of leaders you are choosing.” The man then says, “If we got involved in politics, what would our platform be, what would we say?” Sultan replies quoting Geert Wilders, “Islam is not religion!” The man interrupts and asks, “what would our platform be, what would A, B and C be?” Sultan replies, “the same you dealt with Nazism. The same way, the same exact way. The same way!” To this she receives a big applause from the all too captive audience…”you reversed the Japanese culture, the same, you might need to do it, you might need to do a heavy pressure, I cannot predict the kind of pressure, you understand it, I don’t have to say it.” Quite chilling the way she nonchalantly advocates nuking Muslims.

Sultan also says, “You know Geert Wilders has said if he becomes Prime Minister of Holland he will ban the Quran, I admire him for that.” The audiences glibly agrees with her with mutterings of “yes.” If you want to see how fascism takes hold then watch the video. My only question is how much are these synagogues and churches paying her for her speaking appearances?

LoonWatch: Exposing David Wood: Of Mosques and Men, Pt. 1

Tennessee: Mosque Vandalized Once Again

A mosque has been targeted by vandals once again in Tennessee.

Sign Vandalized at future mosque site

by Mark Bell

A sign marking the future site of the Islamic Center of Murfreesboro was found vandalized for the second time in less than six months Wednesday, according to an Islamic Center spokesperson.

“At this time we’re going to release one statement and that is that this has been a very unfortunate incident and we are just trying to be good neighbors,” said Carmie Ayash.

Abdou Kattih called the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office Wednesday around 1:30 p.m. in reference to the vandalism. Deputy Trent Givens, who was patrolling the area, responded to the incident.
Givens’ report reads that Kattih said “he had been alerted by someone who lived nearby that the sign had been vandalized again.

“While speaking with Kattih, I observed that both posts had been knocked backward in the ground and the sign was leaning,” Givens reported. “Also the main part of the sign had been ripped. It appeared that someone had used an unknown object to hit both of the posts and then struck the top right of the sign and ripped it in two.”

The deputy noted that the object used appeared to have raised areas that left a very distinct pattern on the wood and metal.

“At this time there are no known witnesses,” he reported. “I had conducted a traffic stop on Millwood Court before this call. I cleared the stop at (1:04 p.m.) and then proceeded down Veals Road from Bradyville Pike. At that time the sign had not yet been vandalized.”

The sheriff’s office has placed an extra patrol on the site “indefinitely” per patrol Capt. Mike Fitzhugh.

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) said the latest vandalism is fitting a “sharp rise in anti-Muslim sentiment in this society.”

The Washington-based civil rights and advocacy group, through spokesman Ibrahim Hooper, said they believe the acts are being promoted by a number of hate groups promoting the demonization of Islam and marginalization of Muslims.

“A mosque was bombed in May in Florida and there was no national media coverage at all,” he said. “We’re seeing opposition to mosques being taken to very hysterical proportions” due to “a number of bizarre conspiracy theories,” including the theory that “Muslims are trying to take over the country.”

Hooper said it is disturbing to see the kinds of things that are happening in communities all around the nation, not just in the south.

“We’re seeing the demonization of Islam in our country and it leads a very vocal minority to take these extremist kinds of actions nationwide,” he said. “This is caused by a lack of knowledge and lack of interaction with ordinary Muslims. When people know more about Islam and interact with ordinary Muslims, prejudice goes down.”

A report put out by CAIR in 2006, the most recent of its kind, states that approximately “one in four Americans believes that Islam is a religion of hatred and violence,” remaining unchanged since 2004. The level of knowledge of Islam also remained virtually unchanged from the 2004 report, indicating that only two percent of survey respondents indicated that they were “very knowledgeable” about the religion.

“A vast majority of Americans said they would change their views about Muslims if Muslims would condemn terrorism more strongly, show more concern for Americans or work to improve the status of Muslim women or American image in the Muslim world,” the report states.

Hooper said CAIR will likely issue a public statement about the vandalism as soon as today.

“You really have to shine a light on bigotry and hope the mainstream people in the community come out against it,” he said.

— Mark Bell, 615-278-5153

Source: LoonWatch.com

Debating Non-Violent Islamism

By Marc Lynch

I have just published an essay in the new issue of Foreign Affairs which uses Paul Berman’s polemic against Tariq Ramadan, Twilight of the Intellectuals, as a jumping off point for a broader discussion of the challenge of non-violent Islamism. I finished drafting it over a month ago, and since then several excellent review essays have appeared including one by Pankaj Mishra  in the New Yorker and another by Yale University’s Andrew March in the American Prospect.  I found much to criticize in the book, including Berman’s exceedingly thin engagement with the vast scholarly and historiographical literature, his still-puzzling obsession with Ramadan, and his tiresome infighting with a few liberal Western journalists such as Timothy Garton Ash and Ian Buruma.  But looking past the polemics, there’s a serious debate to be had about how to think about non-violent Islamist activism in Europe and the United States, the Middle East, and throughout the Muslim communities of the world.  In the end, I argue, Berman  “flags important debates about Islam’s impact on Europe and the world, but he is an exceedingly poor guide to navigating them.”

I am not going to reproduce the parts of the Foreign Affairs essay here which deal with the historiography or with Ramadan himself.  I urge you to read the full essay for those parts.   Here, I want to focus on what I see as the more fundamental issues raised about understanding the challenge posed by Islamism, about which legitimate and genuinely significant differences exist:

Berman gets Ramadan’s struggle backward. Ramadan’s primary adversaries are not liberals in the West but rather literalistic Salafists whose ideas are ascendant in Muslim communities from Egypt and the Persian Gulf to western Europe. For Salafists, a movement such as the Muslim Brotherhood is too political, too accepting of civil institutions, and insufficiently attentive to the formalistic and public rituals of Islam. They urge Muslims to separate from Western societies in favor of their own allegedly pure Islamic enclaves. The Muslim Brotherhood has encouraged women to wear the veil, but only so that they can demonstrate virtue while in universities and the workplace. The Salafists, meanwhile, want women at home and strictly segregated from men. True liberals should prefer Ramadan because he offers a model for Muslims of integration as full citizens at a time when powerful forces are instead pushing for isolation and literalism.

Ramadan has not couched his challenge to the Salafists in abstract language or kept it from public view. For example, when Salafi opponents have confronted him with Koranic verses dictating that women receive only half the inheritance of men, Ramadan has argued that these passages should be reinterpreted given the modern changes in family structure and the fact that many women today raise children alone. Therefore, Ramadan argues, Muslims should “try to keep the justice instead of literally implementing verses, pretending faithfulness to the Koran but in fact creating injustices on the ground.” This is a sharp challenge to the Salafists, the significance of which Berman does not recognize. Similarly, Ramadan’s call in 2005 for a moratorium on the implementation of hudud penalties — including the stoning of adulterers — is mocked relentlessly by Berman as too little, but in fact it posed an intensely controversial challenge to the heart of Salafi political agendas and jurisprudence.

Ultimately, Ramadan disappoints his liberal interlocutors because they are not his most important point of reference. He has made a strategic calculation that embracing the political passions of the Muslim mainstream is the only way for his reformist agenda to gain any sort of credibility or traction with the Muslim audiences that really matter. And although his vision may not be a classically liberal one, it is a fully legitimate guide for how Muslims — or any persons of faith — can participate in a liberal and democratic system. As Andrew March, a political theorist and professor at Yale University, has argued, the cultures of political liberalism in the West should be able to accommodate peaceful, law-abiding citizens who are motivated by explicit religious faith. The United States, which boasts its own powerful religious communities and fundamentalist political forces, should of all places be able to understand how this works.

This does not mean that liberals should not have misgivings about Ramadan’s project. He defines sharia — the system of Muslim jurisprudence — not as the law of the land but as a personal moral code, sustained by the faith of the believer. Why should such a belief be alarming? After all, this is how many people of faith have reconciled themselves to civic states. But in practice, this evangelical project of societal transformation through personal transformation — changing the world “one soul at a time” — is more deeply radical than what violent extremists envision. Anyone can seize state power through violence and then impose his will by force. True power lies in the ability to mobilize consent so that people willingly embrace ideas without coercion — so that they want what you want, not simply do what you want. Nonviolent Islamists excel at this level of soft power and, in doing so, have succeeded in transforming public culture across the Muslim world. Walking the streets of Cairo today, for example, it is hard to believe that only a couple decades ago, few women covered their hair.

Later in the essay, I elaborate on the stakes of this struggle inside Islamist politics:

Those, such as Berman, who see Islamism as flat and uniform claim that Islamists of all varieties — despite differences over the use of violence or the value of democratic participation — ultimately share a commitment to achieving an Islamic state. But this is misleading. There is a vast and important gap between the Salafi vision of enforced social uniformity and the moderate Islamist vision of a democratic state, with civil institutions and the rule of law, populated by devout Muslims. The gap is so great as to render meaningless the notion that all Islamists share a common strategic objective. Ramadan stands on the correct side of this gap, and by extension, he stands on the right side of the most important battle within Islamism today: he is a defender of pragmatism and flexibility, of participation in society, and of Muslims’ becoming full citizens within liberal societies.

Ramadan’s defense of participation places him opposite the literalists and radicals with whom Berman attempts to link him. The hard core of the Salafi jihadists view all existing Muslim societies as fundamentally, hopelessly corrupt — part of a jahiliyya, which means “age of ignorance,” from which true Muslims must retreat and isolate themselves. Ramadan, by contrast, calls for change from within. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood offer clinics, charities, schools, and other services, while pursuing the dawa, or “spiritual outreach.” Their approach would be familiar to anyone who has engaged with American evangelicals — the polite conversation, the pamphlets and other literature, the self-presentation as honest and incorruptible. There is an obvious difference between a woman who is forced to wear a veil for fear of acid being thrown in her face and one who does so to show respect for God. But there are other forms of coercion — peer pressure, societal norms, and economic need — that can be difficult to detect from the outside. These are topics for serious study.

But Berman does not even try. He sees only a radical mob of fanatics, not individuals who find meaning in their lives given particular contexts and specific challenges. As Berman sees it, blank-faced cyphers impose a grim conformity on passive communities that are unable to resist (presumably because their will has been weakened by an Ian Buruma essay). It does not occur to him that Islamism might offer meaning to those who are confined to gloomy urban ghettos or that Islamist groups might be the only ones working on the ground to improve certain people’s lives. For many Muslims around the world, Islamism may offer a better life in the here and now — and not just in the hereafter — than do many of the alternatives.

This point should not be misunderstood. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is clearly distinct from al Qaeda, it is not the uniformly “moderate” organization that its supporters often say it is. The organization’s character and goals often vary from community to community, and its rhetoric sometimes betrays a number of worrisome “gray zones,” in the words of a 2006 study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Its members generally avoid making clear statements on contentious issues, such as the place of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, the toleration of secular Muslims, or where the authority to interpret Islamic law should reside. And the Muslim Brotherhood’s rejection of violence at home does not extend to areas where Muslims live under occupation, such as the Palestinian territories or Iraq. Such positions may not please many Americans, but they do — like it or not — represent the mainstream of much of the Muslim world.

But, I conclude, the problems with Berman do not mean that there are no problems with non-violent Islamists:

Berman highlights a very real dilemma. Put bluntly, Islamists have shaped the world around them in ways that many liberals in the United States and Europe find distasteful. Even moderate Islamists prioritize religion over all other identities and promote its application in law, society, culture, and politics. Their prosyletizing, social work, party politics, and organization of parallel civil societies have all helped transform societies from below. This frightens and angers secularists, liberals, feminists, non-Muslims, and others who take no comfort in the argument that the political success of the Islamists simply reflects the changing views of the majority. The strongest argument against accepting nonviolent Islamists as part of the legitimate spectrum of debate is that they offer only a short-term solution while making the long-term problem worse. These Islamists may be democrats, but they are not liberals. Their success will increase the prevalence and impact of illiberal views and help shape a world that will be less amenable to U.S. policies and culture.

But this is precisely why Berman’s lumping together of different strands of Islamism is so harmful. Ramadan may not be a liberal, but he offers a realistic vision of full participation in public life that counters the rejectionist one posed by the ascendant corps of Salafi extremists. Pragmatists who hope to confront the disturbing trends within the Muslim world do not have the luxury of moral purity.

And finally:

Secular Muslims, such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali — the Somali-born writer and former Dutch politician — are a sideshow to the real struggles taking place between reformers and traditionalists, Muslim Brothers and Salafists, rulers and oppositionists. The real challenge to the integration of Muslims in the West comes from Salafists who deny the legitimacy of democracy itself, who view the society around them as mired in jahiliyya, and who seek only to enforce a rigid, literalistic version of Islam inside whatever insulated enclaves they are able to carve out. The liberals to whom Berman is drawn represent a vanishingly small portion of Muslim-majority societies. They are generally drawn from well-off urban elites that have become ever more detached from their surrounding environments and would not fare well in the democratic elections that the United States claims to want. Meanwhile, granting such prominence to ex-Muslims who support Israel and denounce Islam discredits other reformists in the real terrain where figures such as Ramadan must operate. Supporting them may offer the warm glow of moral purity — and they may be more fun at parties — but this should not be confused with having an impact where it counts.

At the end, Berman offers an impassioned defense of Hirsi Ali, whom he portrays as a classic dissident who has been betrayed by the leading lights of the liberal West. He feigns bewilderment at why these liberal authors, to whom he devotes so many pages, might find her problematic. Berman appears unbothered by the frightening march toward a clash of civilizations promoted by al Qaeda and fueled by anti-Islamic culture warriors in the West. Nor is he concerned that expressing extreme anti-Islamic views and embracing only those Muslims who reject Islam might help al Qaeda by antagonizing those hewing to the Muslim mainstream and perhaps convincing them that bin Laden is right after all. Berman portrays himself, Hirsi Ali, and a select group of others as the defenders of moral courage in a world where too many have fallen short. But real moral courage does not come from penning angry polemics without regard for real-world consequences.

The most helpful strategic victory in the struggle against Islamist radicalism would be to undermine the narrative that the West is at war with Islam. There should be no tolerance for Islamist extremists who threaten writers, intimidate women, or support al Qaeda’s terrorism. But defending Hirsi Ali from death threats should not necessarily mean embracing her diagnosis of Islam. Berman’s culture war would marginalize the pragmatists and empower the extremists. Muslim communities are more likely to reject such extremists when they do not feel that their faith is being attacked as fascist or that they can only be accepted if they embrace Israel and the policy preferences of American conservatives.

The Muslims in the West are not going away. It is therefore imperative to find a way for these communities to become full partners in the security and prosperity offered by Western societies. If democracy has any meaning, it must be able to allow Muslims to peacefully pursue their interests and advance their ideas — even as the liberals who defend the right of Muslims to do so are also free to oppose them. Ramadan may not present the only path to such an end — but he does present one. And that is why his liberal proponents in the West, who so infuriate Berman for promoting Ramadan, emerge as more compelling guides to a productive future.

There is a lot more in the Foreign Affairs essay, which I hope you’ll read in its entirety.

Media: Zaira Abu-Baker and Huwaida Arraf

By Stephen Lendman

Download

Zaira Abu-Baker and Huwaida Arraf; Zaira is the daughter of Shukri Abu-Baker, president of the Holy Land Foundation Charity (HLF). Until the Bush administration targeted and shut it down, it was the largest Muslim one in America, providing vital relief to Occupied Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan as well as in other countries and the Dallas-Fort Worth, TX area.

Abu-Baker and four other principles were bogusly charged, convicted, and given long prison terms, ranging from 15 to 65 years – he the harshest in his 65 year sentence for providing vitally needed charity – in America, a high crime when given to Muslims.

Huwaida Arraf is a Palestinian human rights activist and co-founder of the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), “committed to resisting the Israeli apartheid in Palestine by using nonviolent, direct-action methods and principles.”

Huwaida was on board the Challenger I, one of the Freedom Flotilla vessels attempting to bring essential to life aid to Gazans when Israeli commandos attacked them in international waters.

HLF injustice, Huwaida’s activism, and the Freedom Flotilla massacre will be discussed

Source: The Progressive Radio Network

Criminal Injustice Against the Holy Land Foundation Charity

By Stephen Lendman

On December 4, 2001, the Treasury Department declared HLF a terrorist group, froze its assets, and falsely claimed they were being used to funnel millions of dollars to Hamas. HLF appealed at the time but in court was denied.

On January 25, 1995, Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12947 – Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process. The same year Hamas was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It’s still one today, so any individual or group charged with providing it material support (true or false) becomes a convenient target for prosecution.

Post-9/11, many have been, and HLF is one. For the Department of Justice (DOJ), a big one because of their prominent charitable activities. Shut it down and chill out all others while at the same time providing open-ended billions for Israeli state terrorism as a partner in its commission.

Background on HLF

Until shut down, it was the largest Muslim charity in America, founded in 1989 in Culver City, CA and thereafter based in Richardson, TX. Its work was to provide vital relief to Palestinian refugees in Occupied Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan as well as aid for the needy in various other countries, including Bosnia, Albania, Chechnya, Turkey and America. With an annual budget of about $14 million, it “provided continuous volunteering and services in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.”

Its major activities included:

— financial aid to needy and impoverished families;

— a sponsorship program for orphaned children;

— various social services;

— educational services;

— medical and other emergency work; and

— community development, including help to rebuild Palestinian homes on their own land in their own country that Israel destroyed in violation of international law.

The Indictment

On July 27, 2004, a DOJ indictment came down and an accompanying press release headlined: “HOLY LAND FOUNDATION, LEADERS, ACCUSED OF PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO HAMAS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.”

It alleged the HLF “was an organization created by” defendants Shukri Abu-Baker (HLF president and CEO), Mohammad el-Mezain (California office director), Ghassan Elashi (HLF chairman), Haitham Maghawri, Akram Mishal, Mufid Abdulqader and Abrulraham Odeh (New Jersey office director) “to provide financial and material support to the HAMAS movement. It is also alledged that, since 1995, HLF and its members have illegally sent $12.4 million to support HAMAS and its goal of creating an Islamic Palestinian state by eliminating the State of Israel through violent jihad.”

The 42-count indictment also charged the defendants “with engaging in prohibited financial transactions with a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, money laundering, conspiracy, and filing false tax returns.”

It further stated that charges resulted from a three-year investigation by “the Joint Terrorism Task Force, involving agents from federal, state, and local agencies including: the FBI, IRS, BICE (Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement), Department of State, Secret Service, US Army CID (Criminal Investigation Command), the Texas Department of Public Safety,” and various Texas police departments, including Dallas.

The DOJ got a Dallas grand jury to indict HLF, its directors and fundraisers even though they have no more connection to terrorism than do other innocent Muslims who’ve been targeted for their faith, ethnicity, activism, and in HLF’s case its notable charitable work.

Incredibly but not surprisingly in an age of over-hyped terror threats, the indictment accused HLF of sponsoring orphans and needy West Bank and Gaza families. It stated:

“While the program was mantled with a benevolent appearance, HLF specifically sought orphans and families whose relatives had died or were jailed as a result of furthering Hamas’ violent campaign, including suicide bombings. This type of support was critical to Hamas’ efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people and to create an infrastructure solidifying Hamas’ presence.”

It’s enough to say that all the above charges are false, misleading, and outrageous. For its part, HLF “den(ies) any ties to Hamas and insist(s) that feeding Palestinian women and children is not only legal, but a moral duty that no government has the right to interfere with.” It’s the universal spirit of charity and the third pillar of Islam, or zakat, to aid the poor with voluntary alms (a percentage of income) or through a tithe on property.

Nonetheless, innocent, dedicated men now suffer grievously for their “crime of compassion.” HLF never funded, supported or committed violence. It provided food, clothes, shelter, medical supplies and education to desperately needy people in Occupied Palestine and elsewhere. These are “crimes” for the Bush administration when it wants “unworthy” recipients deprived of charitable aid.

HLF’s Humanitarian Work

HLF’s Freedom to Give (family members and friends of the defendants) web site provides verifiable information about the organization and its charitable work. With a picture of needy children on its home page it asks: “Is it a crime to feed these children?” Indeed, according to DOJ that wants it stopped and for so doing acts collaboratively with Israel’s multi-decades slow-motion genocide policy against the Palestinian people.

For its part, HLF responds – “We gave:

— books, not bombs;

— bread, not bullets;

— smiles, not scars;

— toys, not tanks;

— peace, not terror;

— liberty, not poverty;

— hope, not despair;

— love, not hate; (and)

— life, not death.

So we ask: If (over six decades of occupation) obviously shatters lives, while charity builds them and charity feeds children, while occupation kills them, why is a charity organization – not occupation – paying the price?”

No matter, and on November 24, The New York Times (and other media organizations) reported the disturbing news: “Five Convicted in Terrorism Financing Trial.”

After 15 years and two trials, “federal prosecutors won sweeping convictions (today) against five leaders of a Muslim charity in a retrial of the largest terrorism-financing case in the United States since” 9/11.

The five defendants “were convicted on all 108 criminal counts against them,” and US Attorney Richard Roper was jubilant in saying: “The jury’s decision demonstrates that US citizens will not tolerate those who provide financial support to terrorist organizations.” He neglected to explain how juries are pressured to convict innocent victims by scaring them into doing it – a commonly used tactic against prominent Muslims with many other innocent ones languishing unjustly in federal prisons.

The jury reached its decision in less than nine days (after seven weeks of testimony) unlike in the first trial last October when federal judge A. Joe Fish declared a mistrial because jurors were deadlocked on all 197 counts against four defendants after nearly two months of testimony and 19 days of deliberation. The other defendant, Mohammad El-Mezain, was acquitted on all but one charge.

At the time, Georgetown constitutional law professor David Cole said the jury’s verdict called into question the government’s tactics of freezing a charitable organization’s assets, using secret evidence unavailable to the defense, and when they “have to put (it) on the table, they can’t convict anyone of anything. It suggests the government is really pushing beyond where the law justifies them going.”

True enough then, but in the retrial, prosecutors again pushed but changed their tactics enough to convict. The defendants can be sentenced to 15 years for each count of supporting a terrorist organization and 20 years for money laundering. They thus face a possible life sentence – for doing noble work to help the needy and violating no laws doing it.

Nancy Hollander, representing Shukri Abu-Baker, said the defendants will appeal based on a number of issues, including the anonymous testimony of an expert, that she said was a first. “Our clients were not even allowed to review their own statements because they were classified – statements that they made over the course of many years that the government (illegally) wiretapped. They were not allowed to go back and review them. They were statements from alleged co-conspirators that included handwritten notes. Nobody knew who wrote them; nobody knew when they were written. There are a plethora of issues.”

Ghassan Elashi’s daughter, Noor, expressed shock at the outcome and called it “a truly low point for the United States of America.” She added that family and friends won’t rest until this injustice is reversed.

The Hungry for Justice web site represents friends and supporters of the accused, reported on both trials, and has extensive information on the case. It and the Freedom to Give site together referred to the November 24 verdict as follows:

“The lowest point on earth was not the shoreline of the Dead Sea on Monday, November 24, 2008. Rather it was a federal courthouse in Downtown Dallas. At around 3 p.m., the courtroom – where the anticipated Holy Land Foundation retrial verdict was to take place – filled up in fast forward. Family members, justice supporters and government officials poured into the large room, sat on wooden benches and chatted quietly with mixed emotions.”

“Then silence” as the jury entered, handed their verdict to Judge Jorge Solis, and he began reading….”Guilty. Guilty. Guilty.” Unfortunately, jurors were intimidated by “the prosecution’s fear-tactics and guilt-by-association,” especially against innocent Muslim victims of the “war on terrorism.”

“The judge recessed briefly as the jury” decided on whether the $12.4 million in charity to Palestinians should be “forfeited to the government.” After 30 minutes, they said “yes.”

Federal prosecutors and FBI agents “smirked” while most of the room was stunned and outraged at such a miscarriage of justice. The defendants were then taken away and flashed peace signs as they left, displaying their strength and pride for saving lives in Occupied Palestine.

“Yet an aura of betrayal pervaded the room. Two decades ago, they came to this country to escape such Israeli-influenced persecutions, and now they” endured the same injustice in America. They plan to appeal and believe “truth and justice will emerge triumphantly from this gloomy low point in American history.” It’s a curse at a bad time to be Muslim in America. When the noblest among them are victims of injustice – prosecuted for their prominence, activism and charity.

On November 27, Thanksgiving day, one observer expressed his feelings this way:

“Grateful to live in a country where bankers who rape our entire economy receive 100s of billion of dollars in thanks while humanitarians who feed starving children are sent to jail.”

Timeline of the Case

In 1992, the government began tapping all HLF phones and those of the defendants. It also bugged HLF offices and meeting rooms with voice activated microphones. Thereafter, Muslim community members throughout the country were interviewed, vast amounts of non-incriminating information was obtained, and Washington shared it freely with Israel and other foreign governments.

In January 1993, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) arrested Muhammad Salah of Illinois. He was taken to (internal security) Shin Bet’s Ramallah facility where he was interrogated, tortured for 54 days, and forced to sign false statements in Hebrew that he didn’t understand.

In October 1993, the FBI bugged a Philadelphia conference room where Arab-American intellectuals, including two HLF officials, were gathered. Agents then claimed that attendees criticized the 1993 Oslo Accords and praised Hamas – two years before the government declared it a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1995.

Beginning in 1994, the Dallas Morning News and national media began vilifying HLF and connecting it to terrorism, citing Israeli intelligence as their source. In 1996, the Israeli government shut HLF’s office near Jerusalem, claiming it was used to fund Hamas.

In May 2000, Jewish-Americans Stanley and Joyce Boim sued HLF, claiming a connection of its charitable work to their son’s death in the West Bank. In December 2001 in a Rose Garden press conference, George Bush accused HLF of fronting for Hamas and announced he was shutting its offices in Texas, California and New Jersey.

In July 2004, FBI agents arrested five HLF officials at their homes, four of whom were subsequently convicted. In November 2004, a federal grand jury awarded the Boim family $52 million, and a US magistrate ruled triple damages amounting to $156 million. HLF attorneys appealed the verdict.

In July 2007, the first HLF trial began. In October, a mistrial was declared as explained above. In December, the Seventh US Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Boim ruling for failing to link HLF to their son’s death. In early September 2008, prosecutors simplified their case by dropping various charges. On September 15, the retrial began and played out to conviction as one of many (post-9/11) politically motivated witch-hunt prosecutions against innocent targeted Muslims.

This and the first trial had an unprecedented twist. In spite of strong defense objections, an anonymous Israeli intelligence agent (identified as “Avi”) was allowed to testify as an expert witness – with no knowledge of who he is, his credibility if any, no fact-checking on his claims, his obvious bias, and no accountability if he lied under oath. It remains for the appeals court to rule on whether to reverse the verdicts because of this, the use of secret “evidence” unavailable to the defense, and other gross prosecution discrepancies.

Background Information on the Defendants

HLF Chairman Ghassan Elashi

He was born in Gaza City in 1953, lived there until age 14, and then in Cairo, Egypt where he graduated from Ain Shams University in 1975 with a degree in accounting. After also living in Saudi Arabia and London, he came to the US in 1978 and got a master’s degree in accounting at the University of Miami.

In 1985, he and his wife moved to Culver City, CA, lived there for seven years and then moved to Richardson, TX in 1992. He worked at a family-owned computer business and served as HLF chairman.

HLF president and CEO Shukri Abu-Baker

He was born in Brazil in 1959 and is of Palestinian and Brazilian heritage. At age six, he and his family moved to Silwad, Palestine, then to Kuwait in 1967 for about 10 years. He came to the US in 1980, graduated from Orlando College, Florida with a degree in business administration, and helped launch the first mosque in central Florida.

In 1982, he worked as an office manager for the Muslim Arab Youth Association in Indianapolis, IN. In 1990, he and his family moved to Culver City, CA, helped open HLF, then to Richardson in 1992.

HLF volunteer Mufid Abdulqader

He was born in Silwad, Palestine in 1959, then lived for most of his youth in Kuwait. In 1980, he came to the US, lived briefly in Irving, TX, then Claremore, OK and Stillwater where he attended and received a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from Oklahoma State University in 1984 and a master’s in 1994.

He then lived in Oklahoma City before moving to Richardson in 1996 where he worked for the city of Dallas as a senior project manager in the public works and transportation departments and as a HLF volunteer.

HLF’s New Jersey office director Abdulrahman Odeh

He was born in Silwad, Palestine in 1959, then lived in Kuwait for about 20 years before coming to the US in 1982. He graduated from Montclair State College, NJ in 1989 with a degree in computer science. He worked as a limo driver for three years and for his own vending business for 10 years before opening HLF’s New Jersey office. Besides providing aid to Palestinians and others abroad, he opened a food pantry in Patterson, NJ that served over 200 needy families. He also represented HLF in many UN events in Egypt and Jordan.

HLF’s California office director Mohammad El-Mezain

He was born in the Khan Yunus, Gaza refugee camp in 1953 and lived there until age 19. He then moved to Egypt in 1973 and graduated from Al-Azhar University, Cairo with a degree in business. Before coming to the US in 1983, he also lived in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates. In 1985, he received a master’s degree in economics from Colorado State University. He then lived in New Jersey before moving to San Diego in 1999. Besides his HLF work, he served earlier as an Imam in Colorado and New Jersey.

A Final Comment

Post-9/11, Muslims have been the administration’s main “war on terrorism” victims. Many thousands have been mercilessly hounded and targeted through mass witch-hunt roundups, detentions, deportations and  prosecutions. Many now languish unjustly in federal prisons for the crime of being Muslim at the wrong time in America. For their activism, religion, ethnicity, prominence and in the case of HLF’s officials their charitable compassion for the desperately needy.

They now await sentencing and the results of their planned appeal. The defendants and their attorneys are hopeful that the convictions will be reversed – with good reason. These men aren’t terrorists and weren’t accused of violence – only philanthropy to the wrong people, ones America and Israel want oppressed, not helped.

Ghassan Elashi’s daughter Noor speaks for many and asks how can “the government….say that someone doing perfectly legal humanitarian aid should be designated illegal for strictly political reasons.” It means anyone for any reason may be victimized the same way at a time the “war on terrorism” trumps all legal protections and isn’t likely to change under a new administration not about to look softer than the current one.

Stephen Lendman is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization. He lives in Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net.

Also visit his blog site at sjlendman.blogspot.com and listen to The Global Research News Hour on RepublicBroadcasting.org Mondays from 11AM – 1PM US Central time for cutting-edge discussions with distinguished guests on world and national topics. All programs are archived for easy listening.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11219

Stephen Lendman is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Stephen Lendman

commentary: Reading List Ties Sponsor Of Proposed Large Tennesee Islamic Facility To Global MB

National media is reporting on a controversial plan to build a  52,000-sq. ft. Islamic facility in rural Tennessee. According to an ABC News report:

A plan to build an Islamic community center in the middle-Tennessee town of Murfreesboro sparked an eruption of ugly criticism on Thursday  from some residents who don’t want a mosque built in their backyard. More than 600 people turned out for a meeting of the Rutherford County Commission Thursday night, with some sharing their opposition in public comments that at times turned intolerant. “We have a duty to investigate anyone under the banner of Islam,” Allen Jackson, the pastor of World Outreach Church, said at the meeting. Watch ‘World News’ for more on this story tonight on your ABC station. The Islamic Center of Murfreesboro’s plans call for a 52,000-sq. ft. facility that would include a pool, gym, and school in addition to a mosque. The center has had a facility in Murfreesboro since 1997, but says that with over 250 Islamic families in the community, it needs more space. “It is not a huge mosque as they are saying,” said Imam Ossama Bahloul. “This place is too small for us and we have to move.” Murfreesboro has a population of just over 100,000, according the the U.S. Census Bureau. It is about 30 miles southeast of Nashville. The plan was approved by the commission last month, but that hasn’t dampened the outrage from some residents who said they had no idea it was even under consideration.

The website of the Islamic Center of Murfreesboro (ICM) says it ” is not in any way associated or affiliated with any outside organization locally, nationally, internationally or any other way. However, the ICM reading list suggests, at the least, an ideological affiliation with the US Muslim Brotherhood and includes works by the following authors:

• Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (Global Muslim Brotherhood leader)

• Harun Yahya (Turkish “creationist” known for ant-Semitic writings and heavily promoted by the GMB)

• Ahmad Sakr (important figure in early history of the USMB)

• Jamal Badawi (USMB leader)

• Akbar Ahmed (Pakistani American close to USMB)

• Hassan Hathout (deceased leader of the Islamic Center of Southern Ca with likely background in the Egyptian MB)

• Ahmad Von Denffer (German Muslim Brotherhood)

• Taha Jabir (likely Taha Al-Alwani International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)

• John Esposito (Georgetown academic and longtime USMB supporter)

It should be noted that the ICM book list also features “Silent No More”, the work of ex-Congressman Paul Findley, a long-time harsh critic of Israel and a supporter of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), an important part of the US Muslim Brotherhood. Mr. Findley appeared at a 2006 press conference at the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) headquarters in Saudia Arabia to support a CAIR initiative.

The ICM also has reported that is sponsored a January 2009 protest against the Israeli “war on Gaza.”

Ikhwanophobia Comment:

Evident discrimination is being illustrated by a numbered few in the town of Murfreesboro Tennessee as they judged the centre not only with Islamophobic but also Ikhwanophobic tendencies, simply by studying books and reading lists available at the centre.

Since Dr. Yusuf Qaradawi is one of the most influential Muslim Scholars alive it is only natural that the centre includes his writings on its list. The determined ignorance of man’s intellectual value clearly exposes the many hidden agendas of the editors of globalmbreport to continue to not only conceal the truth but fabricate issues.

It is illogical to allege that every Muslim is affiliated to the GMB purely on the grounds that he reads Qaradawi’s writings. Taha Gaber Al-Elwani also is one of the few Muslim inspirational intellectuals, who lived in the US and was successful in creating a breakthrough of the Islamic perceptions during the last 4 decades. Accusing individuals of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood is not only judgmental but indicative to Muslims and Muslim Brotherhood members.

In fact the addition of other great writers on the IMC’s list such as Harun Yahya, J. Esposito and Akbar Ahmed confirms that they are important and respected intellectuals.

The distortion of facts is not only unacceptable; but an unjust  violation of the most basic of human rights. Once again the GMBR attempts to twist the truth in an effort to serve its hate speech.

Another Mosque Controvery: Lilburn

Lilburn mosque foes allege harassment

by Shane Blatt

Lilburn’s Hood Road carries new Gwinnett into old Gwinnett. The mile of asphalt begins with a mosque at U.S. 29 and turns into a byway of houses, trees and gardens.

But now, when the sun goes down, tension grows in this tidy, middle-class neighborhood.

Some residents opposed to a mosque expansion on Hood Road say for the past seven months, they’ve been the frequent targets of harassment, mostly by those they describe as “Middle Eastern men”. But a founder of the mosque says the claims are unfounded and the city’s mayor, who lives on Hood Road, hasn’t witnessed anything unusual.

Nonetheless, residents have reported vehicles traveling the road at night with occupants yelling, making obscene gestures, snapping photos, even confronting two women in their driveway.

Since November, when city leaders ruled against a local Muslim congregation’s plans to expand, the Lilburn Police Department has received 21 calls of suspicious activity along Hood Road.

Lilburn police officials say they have investigated every claim and patrolled Hood Road around the clock for two months starting in April, when reports started to escalate.

“We have been unable to substantiate any crime by any person there,” Lilburn police Capt. Bruce Hedley told The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. “[Residents] feel certain people have been driving up and down the road harassing them. Suspicious cars simply driving down the road is not something we can arrest someone for.”

And Wasi Zaidi, a founding member of the Muslim congregation of Dar-E-Abbas, said residents’ claims are “all lies and B.S.,” trumped up by a handful of people who have a political ax to grind against the mayor and the Police Department.

Still, residents say, the harassment is real. Some have installed security camera systems. Others are carrying guns.

“A lot of people are locked and loaded because they don’t know what’s going to happen,” resident Angel Alonso, 46, said. “We have a feeling somebody is going to get hurt.”

Residents say the harassment started Nov. 18, the same day the Lilburn City Council rejected the congregation’s proposal for a 20,000-square-foot mosque, cemetery and gym at U.S. 29 and Hood Road. The council’s decision has since sparked a federal religious discrimination lawsuit against the city.

The congregation has worshipped at two 2,000-square-foot buildings on the same property for nearly 12 years. It owns 1.4 acres of the land and wanted to buy an additional 6.5 acres to accommodate the city’s growing Muslim population. Lilburn Mayor Diana Preston owns four of those acres.

In November, more than 400 residents packed the Gwinnett County courthouse to protest the rezoning. They argued it would pose traffic and parking problems and run afoul of the city’s land-use plan.

After the meeting in Lawrenceville, resident Janie Hood said she was followed and boxed in on U.S. 29 by a van and sport utility vehicle full of “Middle Eastern” males, according to a police report. The vehicles were pulled over. Hood didn’t pursue the matter further, the report said.

But Hood said she didn’t drop it. Since March, she said she has spoken three times to the Gwinnett County District Attorney’s Office, which is investigating.

Now the 56-year-old Hood, whose father and grandfather built Hood Road, won’t sleep at her house at night, not since an attempted break-in in late December, she said. And on April 23, Hood said five vehicles pulled in front of her property. Two to three men exited and approached, according to a police report. Hood’s daughter, Christi Nichols, who feared for her safety, grabbed a firearm and told the men to leave, the report said.

“It’s getting worse and worse,” Hood said. “All we get from the Police Department is, ‘Stay in your house.’ We will stay in our house, but we should haven’t to.”

Zaidi, of the Muslim congregation, said the 90-plus families who worship at the mosque have “nothing to do with this.”

“They’re saying the mayor isn’t doing her job, the police chief isn’t doing his job,” Zaidi said. “But if they falsely accuse us, we will sue them.”

For months, the mayor was in the cross hairs of the controversy. In January, a group of residents demanded Preston step down or be removed from office for trying to sell her land to the congregation. Preston maintained she had a right to sell her property and refused to quit.

To avoid a conflict of interest, Preston recuses herself from all mosque-related meetings.

As for the harassment claims, Preston gardens close to dusk and up until recently has slept with her windows open. She said she hasn’t seen or heard anything.

“It’s a mystery,” the mayor said. “But every complaint that is made the city is taking seriously and investigating it and giving it due process. A policeman is here quite frequently. I really don’t know what else [the city] could do.”

Yusof Burke, president of the board for the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Georgia, said the city’s decision against the rezoning created tension in the neighborhood, but he didn’t think it would boil up into this.

“I’ve never heard of this happening before,” Burke said of the alleged harassment. “The best solution is to meet and talk things out.”

A month ago, a group of residents met with the city manager and police officials.

“We were told that yes, people can take pictures of our houses. Yes, they can stop in front of our houses,” resident Allan Owen said. “The city has essentially been useless.”

Councilman Scott Batterton said the city has tied up significant police manpower to investigate every claim.

“I feel like we need to make no apologies in terms of our efforts to catch or to see what’s going on on Hood Road,” he said. “Policeman like to arrest people for doing wrong. So far, they have not yet been able to identify anyone.”

Capt. Hedley said Lilburn police officers now patrol Hood Road twice a day, and they will continue to investigate all leads.

“I’d love for the community to return to where it was,” Hedley said. “A nice, peaceful neighborhood.”

Source: LoonWatch.com

Sami Al-Arian and Mazen Al-Najjar: A Tale Of Two Palestinian Brothers-in-law

[Sami Al-Arian poses for a picture with, then Presidential Candidate, George W. Bush (just prior to the contentious election of 2000). Besides the obvious, this picture is also interesting because it was taken exactly seven years ago. The picture also includes Al-Arian’s family and a smiling Laura Bush (arm placed warmly on what appears to be the shoulder of Al-Arian’s son).] [Source]

By Richard H. Curtiss

The story of Sami Al-Arian and his best friend and brother-in-law, Mazen Al-Najjar, is a saga of tragedy and cruel fate. There is no moral. There is no villain. There is no hero. What is needed, however, is relief from a nightmare that otherwise might never end.

Sami is a Palestinian who was born in Kuwait and whose family later moved to Cairo, where Sami’s father owned a small clothing store. He put all of his limited means into his eldest son’s U.S. education. When Sami finished college he went on to earn a Ph.D. degree and soon found a position with the University of South Florida (USF) in Tampa, with an enrollment of 31,000.

Meanwhile Sami’s friend Mazen Al-Najjar went with his Palestinian family to Saudi Arabia. Later Mazen arrived in the United States on a visitor’s visa. The two friends now had become brothers-in-law, with Sami’s marriage to Mazen’s sister, Nahla.

By this time Mazen, too, had a Ph.D. degree and began teaching at the same university as Sami. Mazen eventually had three daughters, and Sami had five children.

Together the two friends set up a mosque in Tampa, along with two charitable and educational organizations. These were Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP), which raised money for orphans, and World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), which sponsored scholarships. They published an Arabic journal and held conferences, some of the speakers at which had radical connections.

Then fate took an unexpected turn for the worse. The Immigration and Nationalization Service arrested Mazen because he had not been able to regularize his immigration status, due to the fact that he was Palestinian and therefore had no nationality of record.

By this time, with three American citizen daughters and a wife, and no other violations of any kind, it should have been simple enough to change Mazen’s status. Typically in such cases, immigration authorities only require character references, which can easily be found. If all else fails, a friendly congressman can usually help. Mazen is a Palestinian, however—which always presents complications.

With the best intentions in the world, Sami went public to defend Mazen. In retrospect, it probably was not a wise decision. That is because Sami already had become involved with a related problem having to do with another USF professor, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah. Two years after he joined the university faculty, Shallah abruptly moved to Syria to work for the Syria-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which the United States considers a terrorist organization.

Sami and Mazen’s problems became intertwined with that of the Jihad member. Like a bulldog, the media had a story and wouldn’t let go.

It should have been simple enough to change Mazen’s status.

“Self-styled” investigative journalist Steven Emerson also had taken up the case, charging that Sami Al-Arian and Mazen Al-Najjar were part of a conspiracy to raise funds for terrorist groups. The Tampa Tribune received sensationalist allegations that provided great copy. Other Florida papers took sides but were unable to resolve the conflicting claims for many months.

All along, Sami and his wife, Nahla, worked tirelessly on behalf of Mazen and his wife, Fedaa. It was at this point that I, along with a number of other Americans, came one by one to Florida to attest to Mazen’s good character and called for amelioration of the circumstances in which Mazen was now entangled. There were many witnesses who helped in any way they could. Collections were taken up, some from members of his mosque and others from supporters who were concerned with Mazen and his family’s well being.

I wrote about the family’s plight and also asked a friend, former Mossad case officer and author Victor Ostrovsky, to help publicize the fact that there was no trace of anti-Semitism involved in the Florida case. Finally, threeyears after Mazen’s arrest, former Attorney General Janet Reno resolved the case in Mazen’s favor and released him, and Mazen at last was able to rejoin his family.

Then came Sept. 11. Two and a half months later, on Nov. 24, Mazen Al-Najjar left his apartment to get quarters to do the laundry. His wife, Fedaa, a pharmacist, was at work. His three daughters were asleep. A dozen INS agents were awaiting his return. They had a court order for his deportation.

Mazen ran and the agents wrestled him to the ground. He later said he had “panicked,” and had only wanted to tell his daughters goodbye. Then, once again, Mazen was incarcerated.

This time he was sent to a federal maximum-security prison 70 miles from Tampa and put into solitary confinement. The government alleged that Mazen had “ties to terrorist organizations” and had leadership in “front groups” that raised money for the Palestinians.

Again Mazen’s case was in the news, not only in Florida but also around the world. Washington Post reporter Richard Leiby has written a fair, in-depth report on the two Palestinians, published in the paper’s July 28 edition.

Mazen has stood up reasonably well, Leiby wrote, although he is a man of retiring nature and has desperately missed his wife and family and their once-a-week visits. This time, however, it is clear that Mazen is just about at the end of his rope. His luxuriant once-black hair has turned white. How much longer could anyone withstand such treatment without breaking down completely?

Catch-22 All Over Again

Meanwhile, once again, the case is hung up in a “Catch-22”-type impasse. The U.S. government wants to deport Mazen, but no country will receive him. Since Mazen has no place to go, logic would dictate that the U.S. government either prove that Mazen has committed a crime or release him.

The U.S. government, however, says it has “secret evidence” which cannot be divulged. So what is Mazen to do? He cannot prove his innocence if no one will tell him the charges so he can defend himself.

In a just or logical world the answer would be simple: Let Mazen rejoin his family and work to help support his wife and daughters. Unfortunately the matter has become extremely politicized, with Emerson and other Palestinian-haters all too quick to announce new allegations and thus create new headlines.

In a letter addressed to The Washington Post’s Leiby, Mazen wrote from his cell, “Government officials know that I have no ‘terrorist’ connections of any kind, but it is hard for them to retreat from previous assertions after seven years.”

In an interview with Leiby, Vincent M. Cannistraro, former chief of CIA counterterrorism operations, said that, based on his own sources, the professor never was involved with terrorist attacks.

One solution would be to call on Florida Gov. Jeb Bush to intervene on behalf of the Al-Najjar family. That option, too, may have been pre-empted, however, because Jeb Bush inexplicably has become involved in calling for Sami Al-Arian’s dismissal from USF. Sami Al-Arian, a tenured professor of computer science, has been on paid leave since Sept. 27. USF president Judy Genshaft is trying to fire Sami because he received death threats in the wake of Sept. 11, and a Fox network talk show re-aired the old disproved accusations. This, in turn, has prompted the American Association of University Professors to demand Al-Arian’s return to his tenured position.

Ironically, members of the Al-Arian family have made progress in their own right. For example, a USA Today summer internship went to Sami Al-Arian’s daughter, Laila, a senior at Georgetown University.

The first Al-Arian son, Abdullah, had his own encounter with George W. Bush in Florida during the 2000 Bush presidential campaign. When Sami, his wife and family were pictured with Bush at a campaign stop, the then-candidate, who is in the habit of nicknaming people he likes, called Abdullah “Big Dude,” based on his lanky size.

Early last year Sami Al-Arian was one of a group invited to the White House by Karl Rove, Bush’s campaign strategist. Eight days later Abdullah, who was interning in Rep. David Bonior’s office, arrived for a White House meeting to discuss the president’s “faith-based initiative.” After the delegation was seated, a secret service agent inexplicably insisted that Abdullah leave. (S

Pat Robertson

If you’re looking for Christian charity toward Muslims, don’t look to Rev. Pat Robertson or his Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN). Robertson subscribes to Robert Spencer’s view that Islam is, in its essence, violent and irrational. He describes (700 Club, 8/29/06) Osama bin Laden as a true disciple of the Quran “because he’s following through literally word-for-word what it says.”

Robertson tells viewers of his signature CBN show, the 700 Club, that Islam is “not a religion” but a “worldwide political movement…meant to subjugate all people under Islamic law” (6/12/07). At the same time, he claims Islam is a “bloody, brutal type of religion” (4/28/06) whose followers only “deal with history and the truth with violence” and “don’t understand what reasoned dialogue is” (9/25/06).

When cartoons that portrayed Muhammad negatively sparked protest among Muslims, Robertson announced (3/13/06): “These people are crazed fanatics, and I want to say it now: I believe it’s motivated by demonic power. It is satanic and it’s time we recognize what we’re dealing with.”

Robertson is not ranting that his enemies are possessed by demons on a street corner; his soapbox is a world-wide television syndicate reaching 200 countries and 97 percent of U.S. television markets (CBN.com). His show also serves as a platform for other Islamophobes (e.g., Robert Spencer, 9/21/06; Daniel Pipes, 4/9/03).

Debbie Schlussel

Debbie Schlussel

Debbie Schlussel may tout herself to her fan club as the “greatest sexy, blonde and beautiful commentator,” but her Islamophobic rhetoric is as ugly as the rest.

Schlussel jumped to the erroneous conclusion (Debbie Does Politics, 4/16/07) that a “Paki” was responsible for the Virginia Tech shooting. (She remarked that “even if it does not turn out that the shooter is Muslim, this is a demonstration to Muslim jihadists all over that it is extremely easy to shoot and kill multiple American college students.”) When Sen. Barack Obama’s campaign team prevented two Muslim women from sitting behind him during a speech (see Islamophobia Election piece, p. n), Schlussel asserted (Debbie Does Politics, 6/19/08) that they were “Muslim Terror Front-Group Activists” (One of them faced this accusation because she held a position at the University of Michigan-Dearborn Muslim Students Association.)

Claiming a “unique expertise on radical Islam/Islamic terrorism” (DebbieSchlussel), Schlussel presents America as being in “the war of our lives with Islam,” and depicts the American Muslim community as a dangerous fifth column. She has asserted (FrontPage Magazine, 2/10/05) that “Fox‘s 24…actually tells the truth about Islamic terrorists”:

A resident of the Detroit area, which has large Muslim and Arab populations, she wrote immediately after the September 11 attacks (9/17/01): “Don’t blame federal agents for Tuesday’s lapse in national security. Blame my neighbors–the Arab-American and Muslim leaders who’ve actively blocked the fight against terrorism for years.”

Schlussel (DebbieSchlussel, 11/13/07) has raised national security concerns about Muslims being employed in certain fields, and having access to public resources that would allow them to teach their own children Arabic:

She has also questioned (12/18/06) “Barack Hussein Obama’s” patriotism based on his father being born Muslim.

Schlussel’s columns have been published by the Wall Street Journal (6/24/05), the New York Post, and the Jerusalem Post. She has appeared on Fox News, CNN, ABC, Howard Stern and ESPN, and, in 2002=03, her own radio show on a CBS-owned Detroit station. Her blog Debbie Does Politics appears on the websites Townhall.com and PoliticalUSA.com, has she has also been quoted by Rush Limbaugh and in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Newsweek, Rolling Stone and USA Today.

The role of Moderate Islamists in the fight against terrorism

by Ali Mansour / freedom-tale.blogspot.com
The attacks of September 11, 2001, the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, and the war on terror, mainly Islamist terrorism, have strained the relations with the Muslim world, which considered the US and the West at war with Islam. Part of the failure of the US strategy to engage the Muslim world in the war on terror is the lack of a clear strategy that distinguishes between moderate and radical Islamists. By lumping both radicals and moderates in one basket, the US policy makers and the West have alienated a large number of the Muslims who supported moderate Islamists in general elections, and considered them the hope to change the status quo in the Middle East and end corruption and oppression.

Moderate Islamists can be an effective partner in the fight against terrorism, for their animosity to radical Islamists and the stark differences in their ideologies. Most Mideast analysts would agree that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, is the most popular and the most formidable grassroots organization in the Islamic world (Walsh, p. 84), and is also a safety valve for moderate Islam (Leiken, p. 6), seeking to translate the abstract theoretical principles of Islamic governance into a practical political platform (Rutherford, p. 707). Moderate Islamists with their effective strategies to combat radicalism, while wining the hearts and minds in their constituencies, can serve well the goals of the fight against international Islamist terrorism. Furthermore cooperation [between MB and US] in specific areas of mutual interest—such as opposition to al Qaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to expanding Iranian influence—could well be feasible (Leiken, p.14)

Terrorism remains the primary national security challenge confronting the United States and will be for many years (Hamilton, 2005, p. 379). Until the 19th century, religion provided the only justification of terrorism. Then the emergence of the notions of nationalism and self-determination at the beginning of the 19th century, and the growing popularity of radical political thought, embracing Marxist ideology completed the transformation of terrorism from a mostly religious to a predominately secular phenomenon (Hoffman, p. 84). This process of “secularization” was given fresh impetus by the anticolonical/national liberation movements that arose after the Second World War to challenge continued Western rule in Asia, the ME, and Africa and subsequently exerted so profound an influence on ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideological terrorist organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s (p. 84). While terrorism and religion share a long history, this manifestation was overshadowed by ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideologically motivated terrorism. At the height of the cold war, when the majority of terrorist groups (eight) were left-wing, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideological organizations, the remaining three-including the various constituent groups of the PLO—reflected the emergence of the first postcolonial ethno-nationalist/separatist organizations (p. 85). It was not until 1980—as a result of the repercussions of the revolution in Iran the previous year—did the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appear

The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the resurgence of religious terrorism by radical Islamic movements, made it important for policy makers to realize the difference in ideology these groups have with moderate and mainstream Islamic movements (Walsh, 2003, p.82). Mideast experts, following 911, argued that force alone has not resulted in the defeat of terrorism and that diplomatic initiatives directed at coaxing local leaders to encourage or implement change have not yielded the expected effects. As a consequence, these experts favor a “new” idea—namely, bringing the Islamist movements into the political processes of the individual countries of the region. The United States and its allies should therefore encourage Islamists to participate in democratic reforms (Hoveyda, 2005, p. 119)

The dramatic events that followed the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran brought concept of contemporary political Islam to the forefront of the world’s attention. Journalists, scholars, and other specialists have developed and are continuing to create concepts and a vocabulary to describe the Muslim world and its relationship to the West. The use of the adjective moderate to describe some Muslim leaders and movements is one example of this phenomenon (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 53).

The phrase “moderate Islamists” as opposed to “hard-line Islamists” was first introduced by American journalist of Middle East origin, Geneive Abdo. Until then “Islamist” used as both a noun and an adjective designated Muslims who adhered to the more fundamentalist and extremist views than those of mainstream. Therefore, from that perspective, an Islamist, by definition, is an extremist and cannot be labeled a moderate (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 53)

Especially after 9/11, the phrase “moderate Islamist” is often used in the literature and media to refer to movements of political Islam which reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy (Leiken, 2007, p. 2), and an extension to the 19th century’s reform ideologies of prominent scholars such as Muhammad Abdoh and Jamal-ed-Din Afghani, who had traveled to Europe, became convinced of the necessity of reforming certain parts of the theological interpretations in light of modern scientific knowledge (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 55)

Most Mideast analysts would agree that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, is the most popular and the most formidable grassroots organization in the Islamic world (Walsh, p. 84), and has also became a safety valve for moderate Islam (Leiken, p. 6), seeking to translate the abstract theoretical principles of Islamic governance into a practical political platform (Rutherford, p. 707). The Brotherhood differs from earlier reformers by combining a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political activism (Leiken, p.2)

In contrast, radical Islamists, or Jihadists, movements, which developed in an unchanged environment steeped in fundamentalism since the twelfth century, and influenced by scholars such as ibn Taymiyya (fourteenth century, Syria); and Abdal Wahhab (eighteenth century, Arabia) (Hoveyda, 2005, p. 506). These ‘‘extremists’’ are often called Salafis, whose central ideas were crystallized in the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya. Its adherents seek to transform the Muslim community and ensure that Islam as a system of belief and governance will eventually dominate the globe (p. 509)

Shamuel Bar in 2004, argued that radical interpretation of Islamic teachings has become a source of terrorism committed by militant Islamists, which constitute the lion share of terrorists acts and the most devastating of them (p. 27). According to Bar, “radical leaders of Islamist Jihadist-type movements used deeply ingrained religious beliefs to motivate Islamist terrorists and provide them with religious and moral justification to sanction their actions” (p. 28)

Therefore, Bar contended, it’s important to recognize these cultural and religious sources of radical Islamic ideology and address them in order to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy, and without such recognition the war on terror will doom to failure (p. 28 & p .36)

The Islamic Awakening of the early twentieth century, which emerged in response to Western imperialism and colonization, led to the revival of the more “traditional” or “fundamental” form of Islam as a religion and governing system (din wa dawla), where no area of human activity is outside its remit (pp. 28-29). Fundamentalists saw that the decay of the Muslim nations caused by their deviation from the original mores of Islam (p. 28). “Perfection lies in the ways of the Prophet and the events of his time” (p.29) without taking into consideration historical circumstances and developments.

Therefore, in this radical Islamist worldview, the world was dichotomized into two opposing worlds, the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam—i.e. the Muslim countries) and the House of War (Dar al-Harb—non Muslim countries) as it was the case when Islam first appeared (p. 29). The military form of global Jihad was then declared when the Soviets (infidels) invaded Afghanistan in 1980s, which ended with spectacular victory over a superpower. The triumph of Jihadists in Afghanistan and the collapse of the USSR galvanized militant Islamists who argued that the renewal of Jihad against infidels “will result in the rule of Islam in the world” (p. 30)

Fatwas (religious decrees) by religious scholars stipulating that Jihad is a “personal duty” played pivotal role encouraging radicalism and building support for radicals within the traditional Islamic community (p. 32). The controversial concept of irreversibility of Islamic identity –individual or territory—was also instigated by radicals to support their ideology of militant Jihad and to open more fronts not only with non Muslim states but also with apostate Muslims (p. 29)

The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic radicals share the same long-term goals of implementing Shari’a laws as the basis of national law (Walsh, p. 82). However, Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy (Leiken, p. 2). Even among pro-terrorist tendencies within Islamist politics one must be careful not to create artificial uniformity (Schwartz, p. 283). The MB has committed itself to working within the current Egyptian system to achieve this objective and renounces—at least in its official statements—the violent tactics of militant splinter groups such as al-Gama’at al –Islamiyyah and al-Jihad (Walsh, p. 82). It offered the important message that Egyptians can return to “true” Islam and still be materially comfortable (p. 84)

It is important as we are trying to identify the enemy we are fighting (Hamilton, p. 380), to make the distinction between moderate and radical Islamists in order to win the fight against terrorism, but without losing the public support in the Muslim world, which is increasingly rallying behind the moderates in their respective countries for various domestic reasons. Distinction between “Islamist” and “radical Islamist” is as significant as the distinction between “reformer” and “revolutionary” in the contemporary United States (Walsh, p. 36). Islamists are not monolith and lumping them all together in the basket of “radicals” and “terrorists” will hamper the efforts to combat the real roots of terrorism and complicate the efforts to seek common ground with the Muslim world. Leiken and Brook argued in 2007 how the “nuance is lost in much of current Western discourse. Herding these different “beasts” into a single conceptual corral labeled “Salafi” or “Wahhabi” ignores the differences and fault lines between them—and has thwarted strategic thinking as a result” (p. 6)

In their 2007’s study of the “moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, Leiken and Brook elaborated further on the use of various nomenclatures and its different interpretation in Western and Middle Eastern literature. For example they explained that “When we asked Muslim Brothers in the Middle East and Europe whether they considered themselves Salafists (as they are frequently identified), they usually met our question with a Clintonian response: “That depends on what your definition of Salafist is.” If by Salafism we meant the modernist, renaissance Islam of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh (turn-of-the-twentieth-century reformers who influenced Banna), then yes, they were Salafists. Yet the ubiquitous Web site www.salafipublications.com, which is run by Salafists who believe that religion should never mix with politics and that existing rulers should be supported almost unconditionally, attacks Afghani and Abduh for being “far away from the Salafi aqidah [creed].” (This is the view, for obvious reasons, of the Saudi religious establishment.) Such “pietists,” most of whom were trained in official Saudi institutions, argue that the Brotherhood’s participation in politics has converted them into the “Bankrupt Brotherhood.”According to one, “The Muslim Brothers have political goals and strategies, which induce them to make concessions to the West. For us, the Salafists, the goal is purely religious.” (p. 6)

Hamilton in 2005, identified five essential elements in order to win the fight against terrorism; these five elements or five I’s” include: identification, integration, international, intelligence, and implementation. He argued the identifying the threat and knowing who the enemy is and therefore designing a strategy to confront it remains one of the most important of these elements (p. 379)

Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission listed al Qaeda, and other Jihadist groups inspired by its radical ideology, as the main terrorist threat to national security. Beyond these groups there are 1.3 billion Muslims around the world, many of whom may be empathetic to the jihadist agenda, even if they disagree with their violent methods. Therefore, it is the ideology of radical Islam that poses a grave and gathering threat, not simply individuals or groups who can be hunted and destroyed. This ideology joins anti-American political grievances with a radical strain of Islam. Sadly, this ideology reaches many Muslims: those who are hopeless or unsettled by modernity; people who hate America and their own repressive governments, and that is why the threat is bigger than just al Qaeda (Hamilton, p. 381)

Therefore, in order to prevail over the ideology of radical Islamists that breeds terrorism, we cannot rely solely on massive military force (Schwartz, p. 291) instead we must implement a comprehensive strategy that uses all elements of America power (Hamilton, p. 382). Failure to address the political and sociological causes of terrorist recruitment will only lengthen the life of and increase the effectiveness of terrorist groups (Schwartz, p. 291)

Moreover, fighting wars against states with significant Islamic populations will curtail security cooperation with states in the Islamic world (Schwartz, p. 285) and enrage its people. However, lethal military force remains crucial to win the struggle against active terrorists by relying on target killing or apprehending them through Special Forces operations. The large number of civilian casualties caused by conventional wars between states is likely to be self-defeating, as they potentially enlarge the recruitment pool for terrorist groups. And such ‘‘collateral damage’’ can be ethically justified only if such attacks were absolutely necessary to curtail terrorism and if the casualties were unintended, as well as unavoidable in achieving a particular military objective (that is, in accord with the just-war doctrine of ‘‘double effects’’). The civilian casualties from high-altitude bombing in Afghanistan were not absolutely necessary to uproot Al Qaeda and its Taliban government hosts (the use of more ground troops would have been ethically preferable (Schwarz, p. 286)

The 9/11 Commission recommended that combating terrorism must rest on an effective strategy to isolate radical Islamists by engaging the people across Muslim world in the battle for ideas, and show them that we are on their side. Right now, millions of Muslims grow up lacking political freedom, economic opportunity, and hope, and suffering at hand of governments, including U.S. allies, which repress their populations and deny them political participation (Hamilton, p. 384)

Isolating radical Islamist ideology without alienating public Muslim opinion can be best achieved by empowering moderate Islamists and pragmatics who are, because of their knowledge of Islamic thinking and ideologies and their increasing public support are better suited to debate radical elements within their societies. The exact same meaning was uttered by the leader of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party in Jordan, said that his group outdoes the government in discouraging jihad: “We’re better able to conduct an intellectual confrontation, and not a security confrontation, with the forces of extremism and fanaticism.” (Leiken, p. 7). Especially when repressive and undemocratic governments can be a major source of radicalization of the young people which ultimately breeds terrorism.

Historically, oppression of moderate Islamists by their governments has resulted in waves of radicalization. According to Schwartz, 2004, the origins of pan-Islamic global terror partly derived from U.S.-backed regimes suppressing their moderate Islamist political opposition. Then in the late 1970s, Sadat’s brutal suppression of a fairly moderate Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi hostility to any religiously inspired dissent, and Algerian suppression of the Islamic Salvation Front engendered a pan-Islamic political sensibility, as nationally based Islamist parties were no longer viable (p. 282).

Walsh, in 2003, added that because the United States has long condoned the anti-terror campaigns in several Middle East countries; an unfortunate consequence is that though the threat to the regimes from the radicals has been successfully contained, these government continue to receive an international mandate for repression of all dissident Islamic groups, not only the violent ones (p. 82). These governments’ main goal is not to combat terrorism, but rather oppress their political rivals who happened to be moderate Islamists to ensure their continuous grip on power

Furthermore, the suppression of Islamist politics by secularist, often pro-Western regimes and the failure of both Arab socialist and Arab nationalist projects helped introduce global and anti-American elements into the strategy of ‘‘lesser jihad” (p. 282). Therefore, as Schwartz argued, the United States would be more likely to enhance its security through diplomatic and economic pressures in favor of liberalizing Middle Eastern and South Asian regimes, pressuring not just for more liberal treatment of secular dissidents but also for the expansion of political space for nonviolent Islamist movements (p. 284). Leaders who are cooperating with the West in general and with the United States in particular are doing so out of fear of their own people or their rivals at the helm of government in other Muslim countries. By supporting such rulers unconditionally, the United States is ensuring that it will be harmed when the people in the area turn against them and drive them from power (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 51)

Hoveyda in 2005 argued that in addition to the military force we are using in our own defense, we must find appropriate ways to isolate radicals inside the Arab world and to expose the dangers of their ideology for the Arabs themselves (p. 122). Rutherford in 2006 explained how moderate Islamist scholars, mainly in Egypt, with their contemporary interpretations of Islam can help bridge the gaps that divide the Muslim world and Western civilization and remove some of the roots of radicalization and terrorism. These moderate, reconciliatory, and most importantly “authentic” interpretations of Islam are the West’s best hope to end hostilities with the Muslim world and isolate radicals. Once isolated, these radicals can be apprehended or even killed with little sympathy from the public.

For well over a century, Egypt has been an important center for legal thinkers seeking to adapt Islam to the challenges of contemporary governance. This effort began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the works of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Rashid Rida. It continues today with a new generation of Islamic thinkers. The most important figures in this effort are Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa (Rutherford, p. 708). They are influential among the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly the “new guard” of younger leaders who have grown more powerful within the organization in recent years. Raymond Baker argues that they constitute a coherent school of Islamic reformist thought that he calls the “New Islamists”

These moderate Islamists argue that the Qur’an and Sunna (teachings of the Prophet Mohamed) are silent on many specifics of running a state and, thus, man-made law is needed to manage the details of day-to-day governance. Therefore, unlike radical Islamists, they favor the creation of man-made laws as long as they are compatible with Shari’a. (Rutherford, p. 711). Abu al-Majd argues that Shari’a plays the same role in Islamic legal thought that natural law plays in the American constitutional tradition. It defines the purposes of state power and delineates its boundaries. Within these boundaries, rulers and citizens are free to develop specific laws that respond to the needs of their community (p. 712)

Moderate Islamists believe that state power must be restrained, the government must be held accountable (Rutherford, p. 713), the political authority lies with the people and they are entitled to select their ruler and should participate in day-to-day governance (p. 714). They also believe that these ideas are best realized in contemporary political life through democratic institutions. These institutions include:

Elections: support for selecting public officials through free elections. Each citizen has a religious obligation to vote, since he has a religious duty to convey his knowledge of the candidate for office.

Political Parties: the theorists also endorse the creation of multiple political parties. Al-‘Awwa adds that the presence of multiple parties reflects the principle of tolerance of dissent, which he considers fundamental to the faith. He concludes that, “The existence of political parties … is necessary for the advancement [of Islamic societies] and for freedom of opinion within them, and to ensure the absence of oppression” (p. 715)

Parliament: The Islamic constitutionalists argue that a parliament is the most effective institution for enabling the public to participate in the drafting of laws in those areas where the Shari’a is silent (p. 716)

Rutherford added that moderate Islamist thinkers note that they borrow these institutions from Western democracies. However, each stresses that this borrowing is done in a highly selective manner. Al-Qaradawi’s view is typical when he writes that the Islamic world must “take the best elements of democracy without seeking to duplicate it”. The central goals of an Islamic state are to enhance justice and oppose tyranny. At this moment in history, democratic institutions are the best means for achieving these goals and, thus, democracy “is the form of government that is closest to Islam.'” However, democracy in an Islamic context must operate within the ethical framework defined by Shari’a. It must not lead to laws that allow what is forbidden in Islam (such as adultery or alcohol consumption) or prohibit what is required (p. 716)

Furthermore, moderate Islamists stress the importance of justice and freedom of choice in Islam, however, al-‘Awwa adds an important caveat: the freedom to leave the Islamic faith is restricted. The Qur’an clearly declares that apostasy is a sin, although it does not specify a penalty. Freedom of thought, inquiry, and speech are essential to the full expression of each Muslim’s faith.” In addition, al-‘Awwa proposes that each Muslim bears an obligation to “enjoin good and forbid evil” within the community. In order to fulfill this obligation, each Muslim must be free to speak out against evil and corruption. Speaking out in this manner is a religious duty and, thus, freedom of speech is divinely sanctioned and mandated (Rutherford, p. 716)

Al-Qaradawi offers the most detailed discussion of women’s rights. He stresses that women have the same duties as men, and that they play an important role in the life of the community. Trying to exclude them from public life “is like trying to breathe with one lung or fly with one wing (Rutherford, p. 716). In his view, women should be allowed to vote and to hold public office (p. 717), and be permitted to hold positions of authority, including the posts of judge and head of state (p. 718). They also advocate protecting the rights of non-Muslims. “No compulsion in religion.” (Quran, 2:256). Al-‘Awwa makes essentially the same argument, and proposes that sectarian strife has risen in recent years because of political opportunism by trouble makers on both sides (p. 718)

Moderate Islamists, therefore, share core beliefs of liberal democracy. They support freedom of choice and expression, rule of law, political participation and protect the rights of women and non-Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood has frequently dismissed the notion of an incompatibility between Islam and democracy (Walsh, p. 85). Brotherhood seeks to create a “republican system of government that is democratic, constitutional, and parliamentary and that conforms to Islamic principles.” (Rutherford, p. 721)

The Brotherhood’s evolving social network is probably more responsible than anything else for the enormous power the organization could now wield in an open election. These services are compatible with the organization’s Islamist message and thus can serve as an important counterbalance to the supposedly divinely-sanctioned violence of al Gama’ at and al-Jihad (Walsh, p. 84). The MB followed the path of toleration and eventually came to find democracy compatible with its notion of slow Islamization. An Islamic society, the idea goes, will naturally desire Islamic leaders and support them at the ballot box. The MB also repeatedly justified democracy on Islamic grounds by certifying that “the umma [the Muslim community] is the source of sulta [political authority].” In pursuit of popular authority, the Brotherhood has formed electoral alliances with secularists, nationalists, and liberals. Therefore, jihadists view the Brotherhood’s embrace of democracy as blasphemy (Leiken, p. 4)

Instead of the Madrasahs models, run by radicals and Jihadists, which teach students intolerance and radicalism, and even deny girls education, the Egyptian MB created modern schools, where boys and girls are offered equal opportunities for education, learned foreign languages and taught to be effective members in societies. The MB works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead channeling them into politics and charitable activities (Leiken, p. 6)

Moderate Islamists reject terrorism, violence and killing of innocent civilians who are not involved in combat. As Robert Leiken and Steven Brook argued in 2007, the MB itself played a role in resisting radicalization within its own ranks, when “Sayyid Qutb, then the MB’s most profound thinker, and in response to extreme oppression by Nasser’s regime, produced an answer that would echo into the twenty-first century: these were the acts of apostates, kafireen. Accordingly, the torturers and their regime were legitimate targets of jihad. But from his own cell, Hudaybi (MB General Guide) disputed Qutb’s conclusion. Only God, he believed, could judge faith. He rejected takfir (the act of declaring another Muslim an apostate), arguing that “whoever judges that someone is no longer a Muslim … deviates from Islam and transgresses God’s will by judging another person’s faith.”Within the Brotherhood, Hudaybi’s tolerant view—in line with Banna’s founding vision—prevailed, cementing the group’s moderate vocation. But it appalled the takfiris, who streamed out of the Brotherhood. Qutb, who breathed his last on Nasser’s gallows in 1966, went on to become the prophet and martyr of jihad. “Qutb has influenced all those interested in jihad throughout the Islamic world,” said a founding member of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, an erstwhile jihadist group known for its vicious campaign against foreign tourists in Egypt during the 1980s. “The Brothers,” he continued sadly, “have abandoned the ideas of Sayyid Qutb.” (Leiken, p. 4)

Leiken and Brook further reputed a common myth accusing the MB, and movements of moderate Islam of spawning other terrorist groups. They argued that “having lost the internal struggle for the Brotherhood, the radicals regrouped outside it, in sects that sought to topple regimes throughout the Muslim world. (Groups such as al Jihad would furnish the Egyptian core of al Qaeda.) These jihadists view the Brotherhood’s embrace of democracy as blasphemy. Channeling Qutb, they argue that any government not ruling solely by sharia is apostate; democracy is not just a mistaken tactic but also an unforgivable sin, because it gives humans sovereignty over Allah. Osama bin Laden’s lieutenant, Zawahiri, calls it “the deification of the people.”Abu Hamza al-Masri, the one-eyed radical cleric who presided over London’s notorious Finsbury Park mosque, considers democracy “the call of self-divinity loud and clear, in which the rights of one group of people, who have put their idea to vote, have put their ideas and their decisions over the decisions of Allah.” Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (whom a recent West Point study found to be the most influential living jihadist thinker) inveighs, “Democracy is obvious polytheism and thus just the kind of infidelity that Allah warns against, in His Book.” (Leiken, p. 5). In London, Brotherhood leaders contrasted their approach to that of radical groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (ht), that “seek to bring society to a boiling point.” (Leiken, p. 7)

On the other hand, the MB’s success in elections, professional syndicates and social support institutions led to harsh response from the Egyptian government from the mid-1980s, onward. Initially, in 1981, Mubarak offered the MB olive branch, legitimizing it as the primary representative of centrist Islamism, which place militants outside the mainstream. Once they are isolated, he can take forceful measures against them with little protest from Egyptian sympathetic to centrist Islamists (Walsh, p. 82)

However, the MB gained popularity and penetrated professional and student association. In 1990s, the brotherhood had taken over nearly all of the prominent associations. The Brotherhood exploited the longstanding alienation of young, educated Egyptian professionals who had been guaranteed government jobs upon graduation since the days of Nasser but had become heavy burden on the state. The social support network that the Brotherhood had cultivated as the third wing of their campaign during this period was an enormous draw for these professionals; the Brotherhood offered full health insurance and other considerable welfare benefits that no other organization could provide (Walsh, p. 83). The MB experience in the past 20 years have suggested that it may be more capable of providing social services to the Egyptian population, more reliable in keeping the promises it has made, and even more democratic than the secular regime that has enjoyed consistent US support (Walsh, p. 82)

Therefore, and in order to undercut the MB’s chances of presenting itself as viable alternative to the dysfunctional government, Mubarak took measures to crackdown on MB activities that would show a lack of rigid discrimination between radicals and moderates, and very possibly Mubarak’s recognition of the moderates as the greater political threat. In the remainder of the 1990s, there were violent outbreaks that erased the distinction between radicals and moderate Islamists in Egyptian government policy. Warfare erupted between the government and Islamic radicals from al-Gama’at al-Islamiyyah and al-Jihad, launching series of terrorist attacks between 1995-1997, after the Gulf War. The government’s campaign against Islamic radicals succeeded in isolating the violence, but also struck the MB. The regime arrested a number of civic officials, academics, former parliamentarians, and members of professional syndicates

In 2001 and 2002, when several younger MB leaders who were imprisoned in 1995, were released and resumed their positions in the organization. Another turning point occurred in 2004, when the 84-year-old General Guide Ma’mun al-Hudaybi passed away. Al-Hudaybi had been one of the most eminent members of the old guard. His death marked the beginning of a transition toward a new generation of leadership. While the younger generation was not permitted to take the top spot, two of its most respected leaders — Muhammad Habib and Khayrat al-Shatir — were promoted to the post of Deputy General Guide. The new General Guide, Muhammad ‘Akif, publicly endorsed the moderate political views articulated by the younger generation (Rutherford, p. 721)

Despite of the MB tolerance and moderation facing increasing repression by the Egyptian government; Egypt’s interior minister said to The Economist,” The Brotherhood is a greater threat to the safety of the state than the terrorists and the militant groups. We are determined not to go Algeria’s way”. In 1994, Mubarak told The New Yorker “The Middle East terrorism is a by-product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood” (Walsh, p. 84), despite of lack of evidence that supports the MB violent tendencies (p. 85). MB leader Ahmed Hassanein insists that the Brotherhood has never ordered an act of terrorism, even during the organization’s truly underground days in the peak of the Nasser revolutions. Even today, there have been no concrete links made between acts of terrorism and anyone who might be construed an official of the MB. The Brotherhood does not deny, however, that members of the organization have committed radical acts. Just because the Brotherhood shares the same long-term goal as radical group does not necessarily mean there is an overlap in their short-term methods, and at this point there is no evidence to undermine the Brotherhood’s peaceful rhetoric (p. 86).

According to Leiken & Brook “The Brotherhood claims success at sifting radicalism out of its ranks through organizational discipline and a painstaking educational program. (One Muslim Brother noted that the organization’s motto could be “Listen and Obey.”) If a Muslim Brother wishes to commit violence, he generally leaves the organization to do so. That said, a number of militants have passed through the Brotherhood since its inception, and the path from the Brotherhood to jihad is not buried in sand. Defections have historically occurred when the organization has faced a conjunction of internal and external pressures, as when the takfiri element emerged under repression to produce the Egyptian jihadist movement. Today, however, Brothers who leave the organization are more likely to join the moderate center rather than to take up jihad” (p. 7)

Few of the vices the Western world seeks to combat in the Middle East apply to the Brotherhood, but many of them do apply to the Egyptian regime, which has unquestionably failed to deliver meaningful economic relief to an extremely poor population, remains undemocratic, and uses violence in an arbitrary fashion. In this light, the gap between Western and centrist Islamist interest seems significantly less difficult to close (Walsh, p. 86). Furthermore cooperation [between MB and US] in specific areas of mutual interest—such as opposition to al Qaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to expanding Iranian influence—could well be feasible (Leiken, p.14)

References

Bar, S. (2004, June). The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism. Policy Review

Campagna, J. (1996, summer). From accommodation to confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak years. Journal of International Affairs, 50(1), 278.

Hamilton, L. (2005, Summer). Fighting terrorism. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,
12(2), pp. 379-390.

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press

Hoveyda, F. (2001). Moderate Islamists? American Foreign Policy Interests, (23), pp. 53-59.

Hoveyda, F. (2005). A new strategy against Islamist terrorism? American Foreign Policy
Interests, (27), pp. 119-123.

Hoveyda, f. (2005). Understanding and fighting Islamist terrorism. American Foreign Policy Interests, (27), pp. 503-512.

Huntington, S. (1993, summer). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49.

Leiken, R., & Brooke, S. (2007, March). The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Foreign Affairs, 86(2), pp. 107-121.

Rutherford, B. K. (2006, Autumn). What do Egypt Islamists want? Moderate Islam and the rise of Islamic constitutionalism. Middle East Journal, 60 (4), pp. 707-731.

Schwartz, J. (2004, April). Misreading Islamist terrorism: The “War Against Terrorism” and
Just-War theory. Metaphilosophy, 35(3), pp. 26-68.

Walsh, J. (2003, Winter). Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Harvard International Review, 24(4), 32.

The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood

By: Robert S.Leiken&Steven Brooke, foreign affairs

friend or foe?

The Muslim Brotherhood is the worldsoldest,largest,and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial, condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers radical Islamists and a vital component of the enemys assault force … deeply hostile to the United States. Al Qaedas Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for elections … instead of into the lines of jihad. Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.

But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. foreign policy, especially Washingtons support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process.

Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, France, Jordan, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. In long and sometimes heated discussions, we explored the Brotherhoods stance on democracy and jihad,Israel and Iraq, the United States, and what sort of society the group seeks to create.The Brotherhood is a collection of national groups with di?ering outlooks,and the various factions disagree about how best to advance its mission. But all reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy. There is also a current within the Brotherhood willing to engage with the United States. In the past several decades, this currentalong with the realities of practical politicshas pushed much of the Brotherhood toward moderation.

U.S.policymaking has been handicapped by Washingtons tendency to see the Muslim Brotherhoodand the Islamist movement as a wholeas a monolith. Policymakers should instead analyze each national and local group independently and seek out those that are open to engagement. In the anxious and often fruitless search for Muslim moderates,policymakers should recognize that the Muslim Brotherhood presents a notable opportunity.

big brothers

Since its founding in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has sought to fuse religious revival with anti-imperialismresistance to foreign domination through the exaltation of Islam. At its begin- ning, the Brotherhood di?ered from earlier reformers by combining a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political activism.The Brotherhood pursued an Islamic society through tarbiyya (preaching and educating),concentrating first on changing the outlook of individuals,then families,and finallysocieties.Although the Brother- hoods origins were lower-middle class,it soon pushed Islamization into the local bourgeoisie and then clear to the palace. At the same time, it formed the armed Special Apparatus, replicating Young Egypts Greenshirts, the Wafds Blueshirts, nascent Nazi Brown- shirts, and other paramilitary organizations that were rife in the Middle East at the time.

In 1948, with civil strife looming, the Egyptian government dis- solved the Brotherhood. Later that year, a number of Brothers were implicated in the murder of the prime minister. Despite his public denunciation of the assassins, Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhoods founder, was soon assassinated as wellleaving the factionalized Brothers squabbling over a successor.

In a gesture of conciliation to the palace (and also to prevent a single faction from dominating),the Brotherhood chose an outsider, the respected judge Hasan al-Hudaybi,to succeed Banna as its leader.

The Brotherhood seems to dissuade Muslims
from violence, channeling them
into politics and charity.

Hudaybis selection coincided with the military coup that toppled the Egyptian monarchy.The Free Officers Movement,led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, had worked closely with the Muslim Brothers, who were attracted by the soldiers nationalist stance and Islamic rhetoric. But the Free O?cers promise to Islamize the new constitution soon proved illusory. An embittered member of the Brotherhoods paramilitary Special Apparatus emptied a pistol at Nasser during a speech,prompt- ing the new regime to herd into Nassers squalid jails much of the organization,few members of which had any inkling of the hair-brained assassination adventure. Nasser, uninjured and unfazed, emerged as a stoic hero,the Brotherhoodsnotorious Special Apparatus as the gang that could not shoot straight.

In prison, the guards applied the kind of torture that would make Arab nationalism infamous, in Egypt as well as in Iraq and foreign affairs  Syria.The Brothers wounds throbbed with fateful questions: How could those who stood shoulder to shoulder with us against the British and the king now set their dogs on us? Can those tormenting devout Muslims really be Muslims themselves? Sayyid Qutb, then the Ikhwans most profound thinker,produced an answer that would echo into the twenty-first century: these were the acts of apostates, kafireen. Accordingly, the torturers and their regime were legitimate targets of jihad.

But from his own cell, Hudaybi disputed Qutbs conclusion. Only God, he believed, could judge faith. He rejected takfir (the act of declaring another Muslim an apostate), arguing that whoever judges that someone is no longer a Muslim … deviates from Islam and transgresses Gods will by judging another persons faith.  Within the Brotherhood, Hudaybis tolerant viewin line with Bannas founding visionprevailed, cementing the groups moderate vocation. But it appalled the takfiris, who streamed out of the Brotherhood.

Qutb, who breathed his last on Nassers gallows in 1966, went on to become the prophet and martyr of jihad. Qutb has influenced all those interested in jihad throughout the Islamic world, said a founding member of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya,an erstwhile jihadist group known for its vicious campaign against foreign tourists in Egypt during the 1980s.The Brothers, he continued sadly, have abandoned the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. The Ikhwan followed the path of toleration and eventually came to find democracy compatible with its notion of slow Islamization.

An Islamic society, the idea goes, will naturally desire Islamic leaders and support them at the ballot box. The Ikhwan also repeatedly justified democracy on Islamic grounds by certifying that the umma [the Muslim community] is the source of sulta [political authority]. In pursuit of popular authority, the Brotherhood has formed electoral alliances with secularists, nationalists, and liberals.

Having lost the internal struggle for the Brotherhood,the radicals regrouped outside it, in sects that sought to topple regimes through- out the Muslim world. (Groups such as al Jihad would furnish the Egyptian core of al Qaeda.) These jihadists view the Brotherhoods embrace of democracy as blasphemy. Channeling Qutb, they argue that any government not ruling solely by sharia is apostate; democracy is not just a mistaken tactic but also an unforgivable sin, because it gives humans sovereignty over Allah.Osama bin Ladens lieutenant, Zawahiri, calls it the deification of the people. Abu Hamza al-Masri, the one-eyed radical cleric who presided over Londons notorious Finsbury Park mosque, considers democracy the call of self-divinity loud and clear, in which the rights of one group of people, who have put their idea to vote, have put their ideas and their decisions over the decisions of Allah.  Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (whom a recent West Point study found to be the most influential living jihadist thinker) inveighs, Democracy is obvious polytheism and thus just the kind of infidelity that Allah warns against, in His Book. Many analysts, meanwhile, sensibly question whether the Broth- erhoods adherence to democracy is merely tactical and transitory an opportunistic commitment to -,in the historian Bernard Lewiswords, one man, one vote, one time. Behind that warning is an extensive history of similar cadre organizations that promised democracy and then recanted once in power: the Bolsheviks, the Nazis, the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, even the Nasserists. There is slim evidence that the Brotherhood has pondered what it would do with power.

Although it has been prodded by the electoral process to define its sloganIslam Is the SolutionIslamist governmental blueprints are scarce, even ones as sketchy as Lenins State and Revolution or Marxs Critique of the Gotha Program.

But in at least one respect, the Brotherhood di?ers from those admonitory precedents: its road to power is not revolutionary; it depends on winning hearts through gradual and peaceful Islamization.

Under this Fabian strategy, the Brotherhood seeks a compact with the powers that beoffering a channel for discontent while slowly expanding its influence. As one senior member told us, It would be unjust if the Brotherhood were to come to power before a majority of the society is prepared to support them.  Another Ikhwan leader told us that if the Brotherhood should rule unwisely and then face electoral defeat, we will have failed the people and the new party will have the right to come to power. We will not take away anyones rights. And in extensive conversations with the Muslim Brotherhoods disparate allies throughout the Middle East, we heard many expressions of confidence that it would honor democratic processes.

Internal debates

Middle Eastern jails, petrodollars, geopolitical rivalries, and the Muslim Awakening have given rise to a highly variegated Islamist movement. Unfortunately, nuance is lost in much of current Western discourse. Herding these di?erent beasts into a single conceptual corral labeled Salafi or Wahhabi ignores the di?erences and fault lines between themand has thwarted strategic thinking as a result.

When we asked Muslim Brothers in the Middle East and Europe whether they considered themselves Salafists (as they are frequently identified),they usually met our question with a Clintonian response: That depends on what your definition of Salafist is.If by Salafism we meant the modernist, renaissance Islam of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh (turn-of-the-twentieth-century reformers who influenced Banna),then yes, they were Salafists.  Yet the ubiquitous Web site www.salafipublications.com, which is run by Salafists who believe that religion should never mix with politics and that existing rulers should be supported almost unconditionally, attacks Afghani and Abduh for being far away from the Salafi aqidah [creed]. (This is the view,for obvious reasons, of the Saudi religious establishment.) Such pietists, most of whom were trained in o?cial Saudi institutions, argue that the Brotherhoods participation in politics has converted them into the Bankrupt Brotherhood.  According to one, The Muslim Brothers have political goals and strategies, which induce them to make concessions to the West.  For us, the Salafists, the goal is purely religious. Other critics speculate that the Brotherhood helps radicalize Muslims in both the Middle East and Europe.  But in fact, it appears that the Ikhwan works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead channeling them into politics and charitable activities. As a senior member of the Egyptian Brotherhoods Guidance Council told us in Cairo, If it wasnt for the Brotherhood, most of the youths of this era would have chosen the path of violence.  The Ikhwan has become a safety valve for moderate Islam.  The leader of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhoods political party in Jordan, said that his group outdoes the government in discouraging jihad: Were better able to conduct an intellectual confrontation, and not a security confrontation, with the forces of extremism and fanaticism.  In London, Brotherhood leaders contrasted their approach to that of radical groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (ht), that seek to bring society to a boiling point. The Brotherhood claims success at sifting radicalism out of its ranks through organizational discipline and a painstaking educational program. (One Muslim Brother noted that the organizations motto could be Listen and Obey.) If a Muslim Brother wishes to commit violence, he generally leaves the organization to do so. That said, a number of militants have passed through the Brotherhood since its inception, and the path from the Brotherhood to jihad is not buried in sand. Defections have historically occurred when the organization has faced a conjunction of internal and external pressures, as when the takfiri element emerged under repression to produce the Egyptian jihadist movement.  Today, how- ever, Brothers who leave the organization are more likely to join the moderate center rather than to take up jihad. In the mid-1990s, internal dissent over registering as a political party occurred in the context of a government crackdown against a jihadist assault. These pressures resulted in an exodus of Brothers, many of whom formed the core of the liberal Islamist wasatiyya movement, including the moderate Hizb al-Wasat (Center Party).

One issue of enduring concern is Qutbs ambiguous legacy in the Brotherhood. Critiquing the martyr, as Qutb is known, requires a surgeons touch: he died in the service of the organization yet had strayed far from the founders vision. Even Hudaybis Preachers,Not Judges,an indirect but clear refutation of Qutb,never mentions him.

Today, the Brotherhood lionizes Qutb, admittedly a major figure whose views cannot be reduced to jihad. But it straddles a barbed fence in embracing Qutb while simultaneously arguing that his violent teachings were taken out of context. What lessons will younger members tempted to radical action draw?  While jihadists have been sorting out the finer points of international slaughter, the Ikhwan has hunkered down to pursue national goals.  In the November 2005 legislative elections in Egypt, independent candidates allied with the Ikhwan, which is officially banned but still tolerated, won a surprising 20 percent of the assemblyespecially impressive considering widespread government fraud and voter intimidation.  In the new parliament, the Brotherhood has coordinated its legislative efforts by forming an internal experts committee, nicknamed the parliamentary kitchen, that groups Brotherhood candidates according to their specialties. Instead of pursuing a divisive religious or cultural agenda, the Brotherhood has pushed for more affordable housing,  criticized the governments handling of the avian flu threat, and demanded account- ability for the recent series of bus, train, and ferry disasters.

These electoral advances and moderate, practical criticisms have made for an increasingly tense relationship with the Egyptian government. The Ikhwans electoral gains were followed, in May 2006, by their support for judicial reform and independence. President Hosni Mubaraks suspected preparations for handing over power to his son Gamal have led to further crackdowns on the opposition.

Such pressure exacerbates differences between various tendencies in the Egyptian Brotherhood.  Since the 1980s,middle-class professionals have pushed it in a more transparent and flexible direction.  Working within labor unions and professional organizations, these reformers have learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their constituents. A leader of the reformist faction told us, Reform will only happen if Islamists work with other forces, including secularists and liberals.  This current finds a comfortable home within the Egyptian umbrella movement Kifaya (Enough!),which embraces the Brotherhood along with all manner of secularists, liberals, nationalists, and leftists. Kifaya was born in fervent opposition to the war in Iraq and now forms the battered core of Egyptian democratic opposition.

(It is ironic that a war waged in the name of promoting democracy has midwifed a democratic front in Egypt that is at odds with the United States and its war.) The Brotherhoods reformist wing contends with conservatives in high positions in the organization who bear the scars of repression and secrecy. The sharpest divisions have occurred over the issue of forming a political party, a key plank of the reformist agenda. Doing so, reformists argue, would serve the broader goals of the organization by giving the Brotherhood a platform to spread its message to an otherwise unavailable audience. The conservatives argue that a party should be an annex to the movement, devoted solely to politics.

Meanwhile, the Brotherhooods social movement would perform tasks outside of politics, such as charity, education, and health.

brotherly love or sibling rivalry?

Although the Egyptian branch remains the most influential Brotherhood group, offshoots have prospered throughout the Middle East and Europe. But there is no Islamist Comintern. The Brotherhoods dreaded International Organization is in fact a loose and feeble coalition scarcely able to convene its own members.

Indeed, the Brotherhoods international debility is a product of its local successes: national autonomy and adjustability to domestic conditions. The ideological affiliations that link Brotherhood organizations internationally are subject to the national priorities that shape each individually.

Suppressed throughout much of the Middle East, the Brother- hood spread across the Arab world and, via students and exiles, to Europe. In the early 1980s, the Egyptian Ikhwan sought to establish coordination among dozens of national offspring. But opposition was universal. Right next door, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood powerhouse Hasan al-Turabi protested,  You cannot run the world from Cairo. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Kuwaiti Muslim Brothers objected to the acquiescence of the International Organization and withdrew, taking with them their plump wallets.

The U.S.-installed government in Iraq is another apple of discord.

While Muslim Brothers throughout the Middle East and Europe inveighed against the puppet Iraqi government, the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood sat prominently in the Iraqi Parliament.

More recently, the alliance between the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Abdel Halim Khaddam, the dissident former Syrian vice president, has been widely offensive to other Brotherhood branches.  The war in Lebanon last summer sharpened that divide, as the Syrian Brothers leaped to denounce President Bashar al-Assads meddling in Lebanon, while the rest of the Brotherhood rallied behind Hezbollah.

The national branches also have divergent views of the United States.

In Egypt and Jordan, even as it has considered a partnership with Washington against autocracy and terrorism, the Brotherhood, driven partly by electoral concerns, has harshly criticized the United States.

The Syrian Brotherhood, meanwhile, keenly supports the Bush administrations efforts to isolate the Assad regime; the kind of inflammatory anti-U.S. statements typical in Jordan and Egypt are rare in Syria.

Even on the central issue of Israel, each national organization calls its own tune. Every Muslim Brotherhood leader with whom we spoke claimed a willingness to follow suit should Hamas the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhoodrecognize the Jewish state. Such earnest professions may be grounded in the confident assumption of Hamas recalcitrance, but that position nonetheless stands in sharp relief to that of most jihadists. As Zawahiri expresses the jihadist view, No one has the right, whether Palestinian or not, to abandon a grain of soil from Palestine, which was a Muslim land, which was occupied by infidels. The Brotherhood does authorize jihad in countries and territories occupied by a foreign power. Like in Afghanistan under the Soviets, the Ikhwan views the struggles in Iraq and against Israel as defensive jihad against invaders, the Muslim functional equivalent of the Christian doctrine of just war. However, the Brotherhoods failure to stress the religious dimension incenses the jihadists, who mock the Brotherhood (including Hamas) for conducting jihad for the sake of territory rather than for the sake of Allah. Compare the statement from the Brotherhoods Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who argues that the enmity between us and the Jews is for the sake of land only, with this one from Zawahiri: God, glory to him, made the religion the cause of enmity and the cause of our fight. Muslim Brothers expressly deny their organization is anti-Semitic.

The current Egyptian general guide, Muhammad Mahdi Akef, argues that there is no conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jews, only between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Zionists (who, Akef told us,are not Jews).  Despite these denials, Brotherhood literature has expressed hatred for all Jews, not just Zionists.  The October 1980 childrens supplement to the Brotherhood newspaper AlDawa, for example, was designed to instruct young children on the enemies of your religion: Such are the Jews, my brother, Muslim lion cub, your enemies and the enemies of God. … Muslim lion cub, annihilate their existence.  But in a recent sermon at a Somali mosque in North London, Kamal El Helbawireportedly the most influential Muslim Brother in the United Kingdomdeclared that to be a good Muslim, faith was not enough. After faith there was neighborliness, and Helbawi related a story: The well-known scholar Abdullah Ibn al-Mubarak had a Jewish neighbor.  The Jew wanted to sell his house.  The buyers asked him the price, and he said,  Two thousand.  They said to him, But your house is only worth one thousand.  He said, Yes, but I want one thousand for my house and another one thousand because of the good neighbour whom I am going to leave behind. After the service, we asked Helbawi whether recent news accounts of Muslim anti-Semitism in the English Midlands inspired his sermon,which publicly lauded a Jew for displaying a sacred Islamic virtue.Precisely, he replied.

Islamists have been accused of using deceptive double discourse: good moderate cop in English, bad fundamentalist cop in Arabic. A recent article in the journal Current Trends in Islamist Ideology found worrying discrepancies between the English and Arabic versions of certain articles on the official Muslim Brotherhood Web site.  But Helbawis sermon was delivered exclusively in English, with no restatement in Arabic.  This public, on-the-record display was far more persuasive than the usual Brotherhood spin separating anti-Zionism from anti-Semitism.

brothers abroad

In Europe, Brotherhood-led groups represent minorities in secular, democratic countries, and they understand that they will remain minorities for the foreseeable future. None actively pursues the objective of converting its compatriots to Islam. Instead, the emphasis falls on the rights of religious minorities. (Ironically, the European Brotherhood- inspired organizations take full advantage of Europes extreme official religious tolerance, inspired by the experience of Nazi anti-Semitism.) One example of the Brotherhoods European approach came after a Danish newspaper printed cartoons satirizing the Prophet Muhammad last year. Although its transnational networks helped spread the word about the cartoons, all branches officially called for peaceful protest.

The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, a grouping of the most important European Brotherhood-led bodies, condemned the European papers that printed the cartoons but hardly in stinging terms. Although it criticized the cartoons for hurt[ing] the feelings of Muslims, it devoted more space to calling for increased cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims.  The jihadists, in contrast, were offering blood money for the heads of the cartoonists and coordinating embassy burning days. In France, the sheer number of Muslims, alarming press and government reports about the Islamization of schools, radical garage mosques, clamorous Muslim protests against Israel, desecrations of Jewish graveyards, attacks on uncovered women, and several foiled terrorist plots have created the general impression, inside and outside the country, of a powerful rising Islamism. That is why a number of French and overseas observers rushed to label the stone-throwing, car-burning riots of 2005 in the largely Muslim slums the French intifada.  But in three and a half weeks of riots, Islamism failed to make its presence felt, still less to establish sharia in some obscure precinct, as reported by overwrought observers. Islamic radicals played no role in the triggering or spread of the violence, according to Frances domestic intelligence service, Renseignements Gnraux. On the contrary, they had every interest in a rapid return to calm in order to avoid being accused of anything.  The chief of the Paris branch of the Renseignements Gnraux told us that of the 3,000 rioters arrested in Paris last fall, there was not one known as belonging to an Islamist crowd, and we monitor them quite closely. In fact, when the Islamists emerged, it was to try to calm the autumn rioters, who often greeted these missionaries with hails of stones. The Brotherhood-linked organization Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (uoif) repudiated the riots in a fatwa. That fatwa was the culmination of a uoif strategy, forged 15 years earlier, to be perceived as a reliable partner of the French government.  The highest-ranking permanent official of the domestic surveillance agency told us that the uoif needs them, presumably to certify that the organization poses no danger.

Similarly, when French authorities banned the wearing of the hijab (or foulard), the position of the uoif was accommodation. The uoifs cautious stance on the law disappointed other European branches of the Brotherhood. They wished their French counterpart would be more aggressive and feared the French were setting a precedent of quiescence for other European Islamist groups of a more separatist persuasion.

As part of their collaborationist, low-profile strategy, the uoif has also maintained a prudent distance from such lightning rods as the Ikhwan figure Qaradawi, notorious in the West for justifying jihad in Israel and Iraq. Qaradawi has gone notably uninvited to recent uoif annual congresses. (For many Islamists, Qaradawi is no radical; as far as the jihadist ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi is concerned, Qaradawi deserves excommunication for his moderation.)  The uoif newspaper AlIttihad even treats the Palestinian question cautiously, supporting only charitable donations to refugees and presenting the Palestinians as victims rather than warriors.  The uoif does not participate in pro-Palestinian demonstrations and steers clear of the charged Arab-Israeli dispute.

It did not take part in the 2003 national demonstration against the war in Iraq, nor in the massive marches in the spring of 2006.

The organizations absence from both the riots and the marches, in the European country with the most Muslims, ought to soothe fears of an Islamist takeover of Europe.

The uoifs discretion differs sharply from its British counterpart, the Muslim Association of Britain (mab),which warmly welcomes the likes of Qaradawi. Although a quarter the size of the French Muslim population, the United Kingdoms Muslim population is more angry and assertive, and far more prone to terrorism. The uoif is more influential than the mab,but the smaller mab splashes in a much stormier sea. When the Muslim Brothers formed the mab in 1997, it was but one of many Muslim organizations in the United King- dom. Many were radical, rejecting the mild, if more fundamentalist, Deobandi and Barelwi traditions of their parents. Already in the field for a generation was the U.K. Islamic Mission, an offshoot of the Pakistani Islamist movement founded by Abul Ala Maududi. While the uoifs voice boomed in the small room of French Muslim activists, the mabs was a small voice trying to be heard in a vast auditorium in which the young were already pitching rotten eggs at their elders.

As the mab grew in prominence, it began to work with the British government.  This cooperation has been notable at Londons Finsbury Park mosque. That mosque gained notoriety thanks to its infamous erstwhile preacher.  Despite Masris arrest and expulsion from the mosque, his followers returned and quickly regained control.The police,hesitant to intervene directly in a house of worship, offered the mab control of the mosque in exchange for ridding it of radicals.  The mab gained a majority on the mosque board and gathered to retake the building.

Although Masris men tried to storm the mosque, the assembled mab supporters routed them.  Since then, Scotland Yard tells us that their reliable and effective partners have even deradicalized some of Masris former followers.

Open cooperation with the authorities has put the mab at odds with radical groups such as ht. The contest between the mab and ht roughly follows ethnic and generational lines: young Muslims of Pakistani descent are heavily represented in HT, whereas the older and fewer Muslims of Arab descent join the mab. A former HT member told us that his group dominates the British scene. He estimated that HT had some 8,500 members in the United Kingdom; the mab could boast only 1,000.The formally nonviolent ht itself is a full step away from the subjects of the British internal security chiefs recent assessment of jihadist activity: Some 200 groupings or networks, totaling over 1,600 identified individuals (and there will be many we dont know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas. In light of these numbers, no wonder mab officials told us that their group was a decade behind, and not gaining ground against, radical groups in the United Kingdom.

divide and engage Born as an anti-imperialist as much as an Islamic revivalist movement, the Brotherhood, like the United States, will follow its own star.  If individual branches resist the intercession of fellow organizations, how much less likely is it that they will embrace U.S. tutelage? But cooperation in specific areas of mutual interestsuch as opposition to al Qaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to expanding Iranian influencecould well be feasible.

One place to start would be with representatives of the Brotherhoods reformist wing, especially those already living in the West. The United States lost an opportunity to hear from one of these reformers last October when Helbawithe imam whom we heard deliver a sermon extolling a Jewwas forced o? a flight en route to a conference at New York University. This treatment of a figure known for his brave stand against radical Islam and for his public advocacy of dialogue with the United States constitutes yet another bewildering act by the Department of Homeland Security, which provided no explanation.  This London-based admirer of Shakespeare and the Bronts appears to be exactly the sort of interlocutor who could help bridge civilizations.  Instead, his public humiliation was a gift for the radicals, a bracing serving of we told you so on the subject of engaging Americans.

U.S. policy toward the Brotherhood is contested between those who view the Brotherhood and its affiliates as a vital component of the global jihadist network and those who argue that the Brotherhoods popular support in key Muslim countries and moderating potential require some degree of engagement.  The former view seems ascendant and explains an increase in U.S. efforts to isolate the Brotherhood such as preventing Helbawi and other reformist members of the Brotherhood from entering the United States or prohibiting U.S. government personnel from engaging with the Brotherhood.

But if the United States is to cope with the Muslim revival while advancing key national interests, policymakers must recognize its almost infinite variety of political (and apolitical) orientations.

When it comes to the Muslim Brotherhood, the beginning of wisdom lies in differentiating it from radical Islam and recognizing the significant differences between national Brotherhood organizations.  That diversity suggests Washington should adopt a case-by-case approach, letting the situation in each individual country determine when talking withor even working withthe Brotherhood is feasible and appropriate. In the United States often futile search for moderate Muslims with active community supportand at a moment when, isolated and suspect, Washington should be taking stock of its interests and capabilities in the Muslim worlda conversation with the Muslim Brotherhood makes strong strategic sense..

Robert S. Leiken is Director of the Immigration and National Security Programs at the Nixon Center and the author of the forthcoming Europes Angry Muslims. Steven Brooke is a Research Associate at the Nixon Center.

Muslim Brotherhood And Democracy in Egypt

The Islamic Trend in Egypt, the Arab community, and the Islamic world as a whole is an expanded one that works on large scales; it is now undoubtedly clear that it has a wide base of supporters.

The View of the Islamic Trend on the Future of Democracy in Egypt

The Islamic Trend in Egypt, the Arab community, and the Islamic world as a whole is an expanded one that works on large scales; it is now undoubtedly clear that it has a wide base of supporters. The Islamic Trend includes various attitudes; thus, its political approaches as well as its concepts towards democracy vary to a great deal whether this democracy is a political system, a political culture, or a practical mechanism. There is a large section of religious people who cannot be considered members in the Islamic Trend. That is because while they rarely vote in elections, their votes are distracted in various directions; this simply is how they are related to democracy. As for the organized Islamic movements that are indulged in the political arena, there are three main groups that may be also sub-divided:

Firstly: The Muslim Brotherhood and its ideology

The members of this movement embrace that class of Islamic-oriented democracy (i.e. that of the Islamic reference), and they are involved in the political arena in accordance with the codes of Islam that regulate all matters of life since the movement started in the early thirties of the last century. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood works on developing its stances concerning democracy on all aspects: the political, the cultural, and the practical. In addition, it works on improving its relationship with other political entities. Its detailed point of view on the future of democracy in Egypt shall be dealt with later.

Secondly: The Salafi Movement and the Salafi School

The members of this group are divided into two broad categories: one of them rejects democracy, whereas the other not only accepts it, but also practices its mechanisms such as those in Kuwait. They have their own discretional opinions on the restrictions that shall be considered while practicing democracy. This school does not represent a noticeable attitude in Egypt; some of its members joined the parliamentary elections as individuals in a limited manner.

Thirdly: The Attitude of Violence

This group is completely against democracy, and it condemned the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the legislative elections. Some sects of this group reconsidered some of its thoughts concerning many issues; however, their published papers did not mention any change regarding their ideas about democracy.

It is worth mentioning that the intellectual and jurisprudential background of this group is largely influenced by the Salafi School. We may witness some new opinions in the coming days, especially since some Salafi sects that broke out from the circle of violence tried to establish political parties like Al-Islah and Ash-Shari`ah. Their agenda included admitting the political pluralism and the desire to participate in the parliamentary elections and other mechanisms of the democratic practice.

The upper hand in this group is still for Dr. Ayman Al-Zhawahri who announced his rejection for democracy after the enormous triumph that the Muslim Brotherhood achieved in Egypt. He called for one way to reach the reign: to oust the rulers by force. He further warned against falling into the American democratic trap. Therefore, we are before a sole view on the future of democracy: the view of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy

Hasan Al-Banna set a rule for the Muslim Brotherhood about how to deal with any new idea. He described the Muslim Brotherhood saying, “The most precise word to describe the movement is “Islamic”. This word carries an extensive meaning, aside from that narrow one that is perceived by most people, since we believe that Islam is an integrated meaning that regulates all matters of life and sets an accurate rule for every issue. It is not helpless concerning the problems that face people, and the necessary systems that may lead to reforming them.”[1][1]

He then determines the scale to judge the other ideologies, “We judge the ideologies that prevailed in this age and caused intellectual tribulations according to the scale of our mission. What agrees with it is to be accepted, whereas what does not shall be rejected. We believe that our movement is general and integrated; as it includes all the reforming sides of all ideologies.”[1][2]

By this scale, he criticized the two major ideologies of that era: nationalism and patriotism; he accepted what corresponded with Islam, but rejected what deviated from its rules and principles. He supported that kind of nationalism that creates nostalgia, freedom, dignity, social unity, and social communication. On the other hand, he rejected that kind of feigned nationalism that encourages partiality as it only served the goals of the occupation, which made use of the divergence of the parties of that time allowing their cooperation only to spread mischief, and prohibiting their unity under the flag of serving their country. Ironically, this occupation added even more fuel to the fire between them, and only allowed their unity under its flag.

He concluded his speech about nationalism saying, “Here you can see that we support those who call for nationalism even if they were extremists in the points that serve our country and nation. It is clear that these edicts are nothing but a part of the teachings of our Islam which is the torch that enlightens our mission.”[1][3]

He applied the same criterion on patriotism; as he accepted national glory, but condemned aggression that is similar to the actions of Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic traditions). He illustrated that Islam respects all nations and cultures, especially the Arabs.

The modification he applied on nationalism and patriotism was that he put the whole philosophy in an Islamic frame, depending on the creed rather than geography; this is the idea of humanity, universality and the new globalization. He also illustrated that the ultimate goal of the Islamic nationalism is to guide the people to the illumination of Islam to create a happier world with the intention of seeking Allah”s Pleasure, and not for wealth, authority, or enslaving other nations through imposing custody.

Al-Banna”s attitude towards democracy:

The idea of democracy did not dominate over the other ideologies like nationalism and patriotism at that time. However, there were other comprehensive systems such as Nazism, Fascism, and Communism. On the other hand, other democratic regimes were attributed with parliaments and constitutions. Al-Banna had a vision concerning all these regimes; he described the democratic regimes to be merely colonial in his dissertation “The Islamic Perception for our Problems”, which was one of his last writings. In the same dissertation, he linked Communism and Socialism to the democratic regimes, “We also face now Communism and Socialism. The world now considers them but various meanings for democracy; it is a fact that cannot be denied by the democrats themselves.”

He further set all ideologies in one context, “Communism is serious at imposing its thoughts on the individuals; colonial democracy on the other hand tries to resist that trend. Then comes Socialism in the middle between both.”

Al-Banna then states, “We all believe in Islam as a religion and a governing system. We not only consider Egypt a Muslim country, but also the leading figure of all the Muslim countries. Article 149 of our constitution plainly declares that the official religion of the country is Islam, and that the official language is Arabic.”

Concerning the democratic practices, Al-Banna had a vision on the constitutional and the parliamentary affairs, “The Muslim Brotherhood believes that the main source of their edicts is the Qur”an and the Sunnah to which if the Muslims adhere, they shall never go astray. Moreover, most genres of knowledge that are related to Islam carry the seal of the age they were created in, and the people they were made up by. Therefore, the Muslim countries should resort to that kind of pure system. We should also approach Islam in the same manner as the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), his companions, and the early Muslims did. We shall not restrict ourselves with any idea that is not set by Allah, for Islam is a religion for all humans.”[1][4]

According to the golden rule that encompasses both originality and modernity, Al-Banna managed to put an end to the debate around one of the thorniest issues of democracy, which is the constitutional and parliamentary ruling regime. He said, “Indeed, brothers, upon perceiving the principles of the constitutional regime, which are based on personal freedom, consulting the people, the responsibility of the ruler before his people, and illustrating the limits of each authority, it becomes crystal clear that all these principles emit from the creed of Islam. That is why the Muslim Brotherhood conceives this ruling system to be the closest to Islam, and they do not see any other system equal to it.”

As for the issue of parties, Al-Banna had a severe viewpoint that was related to the nature of the political parties at that time. The Muslim Brotherhood reconsidered this viewpoint in 1994 in a famous charter that admitted the plurality of parties.

As for the mechanisms of the democratic process, the Muslim Brotherhood was in the lead concerning applying democracy in their internal affairs. This is what their internal regulations and central law asserted. Each section had a general society to elect the chairman and the vice chairman of this section. Besides, the Muslim Brotherhood had a constituent assembly or a consultation council that represented all the sections; the decrees issued were based on the majority of votes. This is still the system of the Muslim Brotherhood until today to the extent that Dr. Waheed `Abd Al-Majeed described them to be the most democratic movement all-over the Arab world. In his dissertation “The Islamic Perception for Our Problems”, Hasan Al-Banna dealt with the mechanism of the general elections dividing the ruling system into three main principles:

·         The ruler”s responsibility

·         The unity of the nation

·         Respecting the will of the nation

He said plainly, “The modern constitutional system provided a means for reaching the authority through elections. Islam does not protest against this system as long as it leads to choosing those who are qualified to be in charge, and preventing those who are not from jumping into authority.” He then tackled the defects of the electoral system in Egypt and suggested some necessary reformations such as: the characteristics of the candidates, the programs of the organizations, reforming the parties in Egypt as well as the political organizations, setting limits for the electoral propaganda, correcting the lists of the voters, implementing severe penalties for forging and bribery, and resorting to the system of electing through lists rather than the individual system to avoid the pressure of the voters.

Al-Banna”s view on democracy can be summarized as:

1. He conceives Islam as an integrated system for his movement, and a scale on which he values any idea.

2. The Muslim Brotherhood is only obliged to follow the Qur”an and the Sunnah rather than any other ideology.

3. Accepting the other ideas initially, and analyzing them into their basic aspects.

4. Aspects of any idea have to be valued according to Islam; what corresponds to Islam is to be accepted, and should be given an Islamic conduct, while what does not shall be rejected.

5. Blending originality with modernity, and building the renaissance of the nation on Islamic bases.

6. Al-Banna accepted the written constitution, the parliamentary regime, and its basic rules; however, he had some comments. He also accepted receiving authority from among the people through periodical elections for which he suggested a form.

On the other hand, he condemned the concept of plurality of the parties due to the conflict between the parties at that time, their inability to attain the dreams of the Egyptians such as getting rid of the British occupation because of the personal disputes between the leaders, and their lack of comprehensible agendas. Moreover, he called them all to be united under one flag. In “The Islamic Perception for Our Problems”, he stated – after he had mentioned the opinion of the constitutional scholar Sayyid Sabri that clarified that most of the parties no longer had agendas to be defended by their supporters, the elections would not be based on choosing agendas since they all became alike, and the elections would be based on the individuals not on the parties, “Reformers attempted to create a unity, even if it was only temporary, to face the harsh tribulations the country passes by. They, however, failed and lost hope.

Temporary solutions can no longer be acceptable; there is no way but to dissolve all these parties, and to gather all the powers of our nation in one party to achieve our independence and to set the general reformation rules. Then, circumstances will allow people to take the way of regulation and renaissance in the shade of the unity created by Islam.”

Therefore, it can be concluded that Al-Banna accepted the idea of democracy and its common principle, but rejected that of the plurality of parties and offered key solutions for the general practices.
The Muslim Brotherhood After Al-Banna

The Muslim Brotherhood practiced their activities under what can be described as a liberal regime due to the existence of the occupation, the tyranny of the king, the weakness of the parties, the wide spread of illiteracy, and the interference of the British occupation, the king, and the minority parties to reduce the constitutional competencies.

Some limited mistakes occurred due to the variety of the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood especially when some members of the special wing committed some awful crimes such as the assassination of Judge Al-Khazindar and the Prime Minister An-Nuqrashi Pasha who dissolved the party by a military command and confiscated all its properties.

The biggest mistake was represented in losing hope in reforming the conditions peacefully and constitutionally; thus, they accepted the idea of the Liberal Officers to carry out a coup in order to make a comprehensive reformation, to participate in this process, and to defend it in an integrated manner. The goals of the Muslim Brotherhood to achieve a comprehensive reformation, especially in the political field, had not completed; therefore, it published a statement in the newspapers of Aug. 2, 1952, one week after the coup. Its main items were:

1. Demanding to try the previous king and his men for their corruption.

2. Abolishing the martial laws as well as all the oppressing laws that contradict with man”s freedom.

3. Ethical reformation and opposing all means of corruption and random imprisonment.

4. Constitutional reformation through demanding to set up an institution to form a new constitution that expresses the nation”s creed, needs, and hopes, and that represents a fence to protect its interests.

5. Social reformation through providing work opportunities, reviving the social solidarity, determining the relationship between the owner and the lessee, completing the labor laws, and reforming the employing systems.

6. Economic reformation.

7. Military education and training.

8. Caring about the police system that was affected by corruption and putting an end to the political police.

In spite of this clarity, the revolutionists disclaimed the political and constitutional elements, as they disregarded democracy putting it in the last of their six-goal list. They dissolved all the political parties at that time and did not establish an institution to form a new constitution. Then, the moment of confrontation came up in May 4, 1954, as the Chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood sent a letter to the Prime Minister, in which he demanded:

1. Restoring the parliamentary life.

2. Abolishing the martial laws.

3. Allowing all kinds of freedom, especially freedom of speech and releasing all the detained and those who were tried before the appellate courts.

Then, came the crucial confrontation – from Oct. 1954 until 1975 -, which was on the side of the revolutionists, during which many members of the Muslim Brotherhood were imprisoned for about twenty years.

In Brief:

The attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood supports democracy since its beginning although the movement completely adopts the Islamic bases, and tries hard to create an Islamic-oriented renaissance. The reason for this is the flexible view of the movement concerning two important issues:

1. The sources of the Islamic Jurisprudence and thought, and putting the Islamic heritage into consideration with an analytical sense.

2. The flexibility while looking into the productions of the human civilization as a whole, as some are to be accepted, while others are not.

The Situation From 1975 to 2005

Allowing a restricted plurality of the parties and depriving the Muslim Brotherhood from its natural right to form a political party in the frame of depriving some powers from this right was the feature of the political life of the second half of the 1970s until the assassination of President Sadat.

The concern of the Muslim Brotherhood during that era was to demand a comprehensive reformation, to defend their reputation against the media that continued to defame the movement for fifteen years, and to reconstruct their organization on the local and international sides.

However, we observe a reservation from the Muslim Brotherhood, as the article of Sheikh Muhammad Al-Ghazali that called for accepting the plurality of the parties was prevented from being published in the late 1970s. Then, it was issued in Al-Da`wah magazine when Al-Ghazali refused to send more articles. This took place after the Muslim Brotherhood”s Chairman”s visit to his house to discuss the matter with him.

Many events took place after releasing the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were arrested in the famous attack of September. A new phase started and affected the views of the Muslim brotherhood on democracy and its culture, mechanisms and means.

Among the most important experiences that took place in the 1980s were:

1. The active participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections of 1984 and 1987.

2. The alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood with some licensed parties such as Al-Wafd (1984), and Al-`Amal and Al-Ahrar (1987).

3. The limited participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliament from 1984 to 1987, and its very active participation from 1987 to 1990.

4. The participation of the Muslim Brotherhood with some other parties in protesting against the ruling system since 1985 until 1997.

5. The extensive activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the important syndicates through administrating them, and its appreciation for the significance of participation without struggling with others, in spite of the weak performance at that time.

6. Exerting all possible efforts to establish a political party, and preparing more than one agenda for the parties.

7. Undergoing the severe restrictions imposed by the government upon its press, and preventing it from getting a license to establish a newspaper or a magazine after the death of the license bearer Salih `Ashmawi.

The accumulation of such experiences through two decades resulted in the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood reconsidered some of its basic principles related to democracy, and clarified its views concerning other issues.

The Muslim Brotherhood issued an important paper in April, 1994 about two important issues:

Firstly: The stance on the mutual consultation and political plurality in the Muslim society.

Secondly: The Muslim woman in the Muslim society.

Among the most important elements declared by the Muslim Brotherhood in this paper was admitting and emphasizing what was declared by the movement in its early stages such as:

-The comprehensive approval of the constitutional and parliamentary regime.

-Emphasizing the fact that the nation is the source of all powers.

-Stressing the importance of the impartial elections, as a peaceful means to rotate power.

The Muslim Brotherhood also proclaimed its respect for the plurality of parties in the political field in the frame of the constitution and law, which determines the essential fundamentals of the community. The movement asserted the importance of limiting the presidential terms of office to two terms under the monitoring of the state”s constitutional authorities.

It stressed the importance of the independence of the judicial authority. It also illustrated that only the independent, inviolable judicial authorities are to settle the disputes of the parties without any interference from the executive authority concerning establishing, monitoring, banning or even restricting the parties.

The complete equality between men and women in the political and civil freedoms with no violation to the Islamic Shari`ah. Women have the full right to receive an education, to work, to occupy public positions, to vote, and to be candidates in the parliamentary elections and all other constitutional institutions.

The Muslim Brotherhood also clarified its attitude towards the coexistence with the Christians. This attitude further developed to plainly declare that the relationship between the residents of the same country is based on the concept of citizenship regardless of their religion, races, or ideology. This citizenship means complete equality in both rights and responsibilities before the law of the land with no violation to the rights of the minorities concerning their personal affairs.

Afterwards, the Muslim Brotherhood passed by five hard years, during which twenty thousand members were imprisoned, 125 leaders were tried before martial courts, and three of them faced martyrdom: one under torture, and two due to the bad health conditions in the jail.

Afterwards, coordination among the political powers was brought to a standstill after a clear declaration of all parties in 1997 in a famous document about a detailed course for constitutional and political reformation. This took place after the failure to declare a national charter in 1995 due to the imprisonment of countless members of the Muslim Brotherhood, mutual doubts amongst the parties, and the fact that the ruling party managed to ally with several parties against the movement.

After the parliamentary elections of 2000, the Muslim Brotherhood came back to the political arena when seventeen members won seats in the parliament. In addition, in the elections of the lawyers” syndicate in 2001, the Muslim Brotherhood won the majority of votes.

After the death of Chairman Muhammad Ma”moun Al-Hudaibi, Mr. Muhammad Mahdi `Akef took over the responsibilities of the Chairmanship.

In an international press conference in the Egyptian Press Union ” syndicate, the Chairman proposed an initiative for reformation in March 3, 2004. Among the most important bases set by the Chairman were:

Firstly: The Muslim Brotherhood is against all forms of foreign interference and domination.

Secondly: The comprehensive reformation is an Islamic and national goal. The nation itself is responsible for adopting the initiative to make the reformation that aim at achieving free and good life, comprehensive renaissance, freedom, equality and consultation.

Thirdly: The starting point should be the political reformation that serves all the aspects of life that suffers from a quick deterioration in Egypt and the Islamic and Arab world.

Fourthly: Carrying out this reformation cannot be entitled to one authority or government; this is a responsibility that all members of society shall carry. The general, national reconciliation that leads to the cooperation of all parties and authorities is an obligation to firmly face all the schemes that aim at violating the area, and to solve our internal problems.

Now, the Muslim Brotherhood sees that there are many actions that should be taken to reinforce democracy:

1. Abolishing the emergency law immediately, and releasing all the political prisoners.

2. Allowing all practices of freedoms, especially the freedom of speech and the freedom of forming parties.

3. Impartial elections that do not suffer from the governmental interference.

4. Giving the upper hand to the independent judicial authorities, and passing a law that asserts their independence.

5. Reconsidering the constitution to cure its defects in an immediate manner, and ratifying a new constitution after the political reformation.

Allah is the aim of our intention, and He guides to the right path

——————————————————————————–

[1][1] The Message of Our Mission.

[1][2] The Message of Our Mission.

[1][3] The Message of Our Mission.

[4]The dissertation of the Fifth Conference.

The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society

The Muslim Brotherhood. This translation of the official document is copyrighted. You may copy and distribute it freely for private use but it may not be published under another name or mass-produced without permission. To obtain permission, please send e-mail to mail.mb@prelude.co.uk
The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society

The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society and the stand of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding Womens’ rights to vote, be elected, occupy public and governmental posts, and work in general

INTRODUCTION

The Status of Women as Defined by Islam

The woman is a mother and it is said that “Paradise lies under her feet” (reported by Al Tabarani). In an authentic hadith the Prophet (peace be upon him)(SAAS) was asked by a man: ’Who is the one most worthy of my care?’. The Prophet replied: ’Your mother’. The man asked: ’Then whom?’. He replied: ’Your mother’. The man further asked: ’Then whom?’. He replied: ’Your mother’. The man asked: ’Then whom?’. And in this fourth time the Prophet replied: ’Then your father.’ This shows that Allah has placed the care of the mother as a primary responsibility of her sons.

Allah, exalted be He, says: {Your Lord has decreed that you worship none but Him and that you be kind to parents. When one or both of them attains old age in your life, say not to them a word of disrespect, nor repel them but address them in terms of honour.} (Surat Al-Isra’ (17), ayah 23).

A woman is also a daughter and sister and like their male brothers, are born of the same lineage and from the same womb: {He bestows female (offspring) upon whom He wills, and bestows male (offspring) upon whom Him wills.} (Surat Al-Shura (42), ayah 49). The Prophet (SAAS) says: ’Women are the (equal) sisters of men’.

A woman is also a wife who is a source of comfort for her husband as he is to her: {And among His signs is this, that He created wives from among yourselves, that you may dwell in tranquillity with them, and He has put love and mercy between your (hearts)} (Surat Al-Rum (30), ayah 21). Allah also said: {They are like a garment to you and you are like a garment to them} (Surat Al-Baqara (2), ayah 187)

Women make up half of society and they are responsible for the nurturing, guidance and reformation of the subsequent generations of men and women. It is the female who imbues principles and faith into the souls of the nation.

Allah, exalted be He, created Adam from clay and Eve from Adam, and mankind came from both of them: {O mankind! Fear your Guardian Lord, who created you from a single person, created out of it, his mate, and from them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men and women;} (Surat Al-Nisa (4), ayah 1). {It is He Who created you from a single person, and made his mate of like nature, in order that he might dwell with her (in love).}(Surat Al-A’raf (7), ayah 189).

There is no direct or indirect text in the Islamic Law (Shari’a) that even remotely suggests that women are inherently evil or impure as found in some distorted creeds that attribute lies to God. In fact, the Prophet (SAAS) said in an authentic hadith that ’A believer is never impure’.

People are differentiated in Islam according to their faith, God-consciousness and good conduct. Allah, exalted be He, says: {O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most God-fearing} (Surat AI-Hujurat (49), ayah 13). He also says: {And their Lord has accepted of them, and answered them: ’Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he male or female: you are members, one of another’,} (Surat Al-Imran (3), ayah 195). {Whoever works righteousness, whether male or female, and has faith, verily, to him will We give a life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on such their reward according to the best of their actions.} (Surat Al-Nahl (16), ayah 97).

There is nothing in the Quran or the Sunnah (Prophet’s tradition) to support the allegations made by the distorted creeds that have attributed lies to Allah by claiming that it was Eve who seduced Adam into eating from the tree. The Quran categorically addresses the Divine command to both Adam and Eve: {O, Adam dwell you and your wife in the Garden, and eat thereof as you both wish: but approach not this tree, lest you become of the unjust. Then Satan whispered suggestions to them, in order to uncover that which was hidden from them (before); he said: ’Your Lord only forbade you this tree, lest you should become angels or such beings as live for ever.’ And he (Satan) swore to them both, (saying) that he was their sincere advisor.} (Surat Al-Araf (7), ayah 19-21). Both repented together: {They said: ’Our Lord, we have wronged our own souls: If You forgive us not and bestow not upon us Your Mercy, we shall certainly be lost.’} (Surat Al-Araf (7), ayah 23). Also {Then did Satan make them slip from the (Garden), and get them out of the state (of felicity) in which they had been.} (Surat Al-Baqarah (2), ayah 36).

Thus, the Quran and the authentic traditions have refuted all false claims and superstitions that may arise concerning women and their purity.

A woman’s responsibility in faith is exactly the same as that of a man. She is accountable for her belief in Allah and the Prophet (SAAS) even if her closest of kin, like her father, husband or brother disagrees with her in this. Allah, the All-Wise and All-Knowing gave an example of the infidels through two women and an example of the faithful also citing two women. {Allah sets forth an example for those who disbelieve, the wife of Noah and the wife of Lot: they were under two of our righteous servants but they both betrayed their (husbands by rejecting their doctrine), so they (Noah and Lot) benefited them (their wives) not against Allah, and it was said: ’Enter the Fire along with those who enter!’ And Allah has set forth, as an example to those who believe the wife of Pharaoh: Behold she said: ’O My Lord! Build for me, in nearness to You, a mansion in the Garden, and save me from Pharaoh and his doings, and save me from those that do wrong’; And Mary the descendant of ’Imran, who guarded her chastity and We breathed into (her body) of Our Spirit; and she testified to the truth of the words of her Lord and of his Revelations, and was one of the devout (servants).} (Surat Al-Tahrim (66), ayah 10-12).

The Muslim woman, like the Muslim man is called upon to believe in Allah, the Day of Judgement, the Book, the Angels, and the Prophets, etc. She is also asked to perform prayers, pay out the Zakat duty, fast in the month of Ramadan and perform Pilgrimage to the Holy Places if she can do so. She must also call for the good and forbid evil in addition to being responsible for the well-being of the Muslim community. {The believers, men and women, are guardians, one of another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil,} (Surat Tawbah (9), ayah 71); {O you who believe! When there come to you believing women refugees, examine them. Allah is more knowledgeable of their faith. If you find them to be believers, do not return them to the infidels} (Surat Al-Mumtahina (60), ayah 10). {O Prophet, when believing women come to you to give you the pledge that they will not associate anything in worship with Allah, that they will not steal, they will not commit adultery (or fornication), that they will not kill their children, that they will not utter slander intentionally forging falsehood, and that they will not disobey you in anything that is virtuous then accept their allegiance and ask Allah to forgive them,} (Surat Al-Mumtahina (60), ayah 12).

A woman also has to study the Islamic teachings for her own personal guidance the same as the male. She is responsible for conveying and communicating Islam. {Ask the knowledgeable people if you do not know.} (Surat Al-Anbia’ (21), ayah 7) {of every troop of them, a party only should go forth, that they (who are left behind) may get instructions in (Islamic) religion, and that they may warn their people when they return to them, so that they may beware of evil.} (Surat Tawbah (9), ayah 122).

The hudood (punishments) that are prescribed in the Shari’a are the same for men and women; the female thief is punished the same as the male thief, the adulteress is punished like the adulterer, the female wine-drinker is punished like the male wine-drinker, and the female who wages war on Allah and the Prophet is punished like the male who does so.

In qisas (retribution), the woman’s soul is equal to that of the man. The murderess is like the murderer and the murdered woman is like the murdered man. Qisas is exacted from a man if he kills a woman exactly and as equally as when he kills a man. Blood money rules do not discriminate between male and female.
The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society

The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society and the stand of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding Womens’ rights to vote, be elected, occupy public and governmental posts, and work in general

(CONTINUATION) It has been shown throughout the history of Islam that women took part in the First and Second Ba’yat al-Aqabah (pledges of allegiance). Furthermore, it was Khadija, the wife of the Prophet Mohamed (SAAS) who was the first to believe in, support and comfort our Prophet. It was Somayya who was among the first to be martyred upholding Islam. Al-Bukhari and Ahmed (reporters of the traditions of the Prophet Mohamed) cited Al-Rabiyya’ the daughter of Mu’awadh as saying: ’We used to participate in the battles with the Prophet of Allah. We gave water to the fighters, served them, and returned the dead and wounded to Medina.’

Also Muslim, Ibn Majah and Ahmed (in their narrations) said that Umm Ateyya, the Ansari , said: ’I accompanied the Messenger of Allah (SAAS) seven times, guarding the camp, making the food, treating the wounded and caring for the sick’.

In his Sahih, Muslim reported Umm Sulaim, the wife of Abi Talha, as saying that she carried a dagger on the day of the battle, of Hunain. When the Prophet (SAAS) asked her about it she said, ’I carry it so that I can defend myself against the enemies.’ The Messenger (SAAS) did not forbid this. Nusaibah, the daughter of Ka’b, fought in the wars of riddah (apostasy) at the time of the caliphate of Abu Bakr and she suffered many wounds caused by stabs and strikes.

A marriage is not valid in the Shari’ah of Allah without the approval, acceptance and consent of the woman and it is forbidden by the Shari’a that she be forced to marry someone that she does not accept.

The woman has full financial status that is no less than that of the man. She has the right, in the same way that a man does, to possess all types of wealth whether it be in the form of assets, real estate or cash. She has the right to use her wealth in any manner she wishes to as long as it is approved by the Shari’a. So she can buy, sell, trade, barter, provide grants and loans, incur loans, exchange assets etc. All these actions do not require the consent of any male whether this be her father, husband, or brother. In his sahih, Al-Bukhari titles one chapter: “A woman is permitted to free slaves and give gifts to someone other than her husband, unless she is mentally deranged.” In this he reported that Umm al-Muminin, the wife of the Messenger of Allah (SAAS), Maimunah bint Al-Harith freed a girl born as her slave without asking for the Prophet’s (SAAS) permission. When she mentioned this to him he said: ’If you had given her to your maternal uncle as a gift, your reward (with Allah) would have been greater.’

In one saying, the Messenger (SAAS) said that women are less (than men) in mind, deen and fortune, however he has explained this saying in a manner that is consistent with the texts cited concerning the rights, dignity and honour of women.

The lesser degree in deen does not mean a lesser degree of Iman (Belief) or that she is less human, in that she cannot rise to the highest ranks. This only means that Allah Himself has exempted her from certain forms of ritual worship at certain times, such as prayers and fasting during her ha’id (menstruation periods) and during her nifaas (bleeding time after delivery). The lesser fortune only means that in some cases of inheritance a woman’s share is less than that of a man’s. The Messenger (SAAS) did not generalise this to other rights or to anything indicating a lesser status. The lesser mind is concerning the status of a woman’s testimony in certain matters like debts and sale contracts, and in hudood (punishments). It does not imply anything other than this and is not generalised to degrade women into being inferior to men.

Indeed, in this regard, it should be pointed out that there are certain matters which only accept the testimony of a woman and not that of a man. Furthermore, women are unanimously accepted as narrators of ahadith (the sayings of the Prophet Mohamed), and this means that their testimony in narrating ahadith is treated like that of a man. In addition to this a woman is responsible towards her duties to her faith and she has full independence in her right to possess, and in her right to make contracts. If she was supposed to have a lesser mind, the contracts and other dealings would have required the assistance of a male.

The Quran addresses everyone, men and women, equally: {The Muslim men and Muslim women, the believing men and believing women, the worshipping men and worshipping women, the truthful men and truthful women, the pious men and pious women, the alms-giving men and the alms-giving women, the fasting men and fasting women, the men who are chaste and the women who are chaste, the men who remember Allah much and the women who do likewise, Allah has prepared a forgiveness and a great reward for all.} (Surat Al-Ahzab (33), ayah 35). Allah also says: {It is not for a believing man or woman, when Allah and His messenger have decreed a matter, that they should have any option in their decision.} (Surat Al-Ahzab (33), ayah 36) and {Say to the believers to lower off their gaze and be chaste for this is more pure for them and God knows what they do. Say to the believing women to lower off their gaze and be chaste.} (Surat Al-Nour (24), ayah 30).

As for the Qawwaamah (directing role) that men have over women as mentioned in Allah’s saying {men are the protectors and maintainers of women} (Surat Al-Nisa’ (4), ayah 34), this should not be understood as an absolute and general attitude in all things and for all men over all women. The above verse goes on to an explanation of the matter. {For what Allah has favoured some of them over others and for the money they spend.} This determines that a directing role is confined to the family alone and to matters only concerning the husband and wife relationship. As was said earlier the husband has no such directing role over the financial assets of his wife. All her decisions concerning her own property are valid and the husband can not nullify any of them. None of these decisions require the husband’s permission.

This Qawwaamah is merely a matter of leadership and directing in exchange for duties that should be performed. For it is the husband who pays the dowry in marriage, it is he who provides the house, its furniture, and all its needs and it is he who provides for the wife and children. He cannot force his wife to pay for any of these expenses even if she is wealthy. In most cases, the husband is older and it is the husband who is usually the breadwinner of the family and mixes more, with a wider range of people. Every type of group including the family must have a leader to guide it within the limits of what Allah has ordained for there can be no obedience for a human being in a matter involving disobedience to the Creator. It is the husband who is qualified for that leadership.

This role is not one of repression, hegemony, or tyranny but one of kindness, love and gentleness. It directs to the right path in wisdom and benevolence. It is fundamentally based on consultations, as the Quran speaks of the Muslims as {having their affairs in consultation among them.} (Surat Al-Shura (42), ayah 38); this being a general injunction. There is also a specific order in Quran for consultations in the affairs of marriage: {Should they (husband and wife) wish to separate from each other in agreement and upon consultation then they can do so blame lessly.} (Surat Al-Baqara (2),ayah 232). Similarly, in divorce: {And it is not lawful for you (men) to take back (from your wives) any of your gifts which you have given them, except when both parties fear that they would be unable to keep the limits ordained by Allah (e.g. to deal with each other on a fair basis). Then if you fear that they would not be able to keep the limits ordained by Allah, then there is no sin on either of them if she gives something for her freedom} (Surat Al-Baqara (2), ayah 229). Add to this Allah’s saying: {Live with them (wives) in honourably (kindness). If you hate them, it may be that you hate a thing and Allah brings through it a great deal of Good.} (Surat Al-Nisa’ (4), ayah 19). Other texts in the Shari’a indicate in a clear manner that marital life is based on comfort, gentleness and love and they categorically set out the meaning of Qawwaamah and its limits. Qawwaamah does not mean that women are lower or that they have less rights, Qawwaamah means, as Allah has indicated, that men are responsible for what they spend.

The general rule, therefore, is equality between men and women. The exceptions are from Allah, the All-Knowing and All-Aware because it is He who knows His creation best and the exceptions are in those specific characteristics that distinguish the female from the male. These differences are due to the separate functions that have been accorded to the male and the female. It is because of these complimentary and necessary distinctions that a man becomes attracted to a woman and a woman becomes attracted to a man and a marriage can be a happy, constructive and a healthy one.

The woman’s nature as the mother means that there are certain virtues which Allah has made specific to her such as the protection of her honour and the honour of her offspring. For example, religious texts ordained that the woman’s body, except for the face and the hands, should be covered in front of all except those who are a mahram (those she is forbidden to marry). And that a woman should not sit in private with a man who is not mahram.

Furthermore, the female has a greater sense of modesty and sensitivity. Hence, though she should demand her rights and practise them accordingly, this practice should be such that her modesty, dignity, virtue and sanctity be preserved.
The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society

The Role of Muslim Women in an Islamic Society and the stand of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding Womens’ rights to vote, be elected, occupy public and governmental posts, and work in general

(CONTINUATION) We must not forget that the woman has a noble and significant task entrusted to her by Allah Almighty, child-bearing and motherhood. A man cannot undertake this most noble of tasks, which is being denigrated today by some; furthermore the human race itself would disappear in the absence of this process. Moreover, it is the mother that suckles the baby with her milk, giving out of care, nurturing the child, the effects of which remain with him throughout his life. The woman is also the lord of the house and it is her task to care for the family and prepare the home as a place of comfort; her role is a huge responsibility and noble mission that must not be in any way neglected or underestimated.

These characteristics, duties and rights which have been allocated to women by Allah are in balance with the duties she has towards her husband and her children. These duties must be given precedence over other responsibilities and they are necessary for the stability of the family which is the basic cell of the society and the cause for its cohesion, strength, and efficiency. However, the husband has a right to permit his wife to work. This right is to be regulated by an agreement between the husband and the wife. Such rights should not be regulated by law and the authorities should not interfere with them except in some rare cases.

THE WOMAN’S RIGHT TO VOTE, BE ELECTED AND OCCUPY PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENTAL POSTS.

We hope that we have been able to shed some light on the status of the Muslim woman in an Islamic society concerning her rights and duties. We now deal with the issue of the woman’s right to vote and be elected as a member to representative councils, or to assume public office or carry out professional work.

Firstly, women and the right of electing members of representative councils and similar bodies

We are of the view that there is nothing in Shari’a to prevent women from taking part in these matters. Allah says: {the men believers and the women believers are responsible for each other . They enjoin the good and forbid the evil } (Surat al-Tawbah’ (9), ayah 71) and His saying {Let there arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good and forbidding all Evil. And it is they who are the successful.} (Surat Al-Imran (3), ayah 104). This verse includes a command that gives women the right to enjoin the good and forbid the evil and part of this is the right to vote for the representative council in the elections. Some Muslim countries stipulate that it is the absolute right of women to vote in the elections because these countries wish to demonstrate their “democratic basis”; the Muslim women should not avoid this opportunity because their reluctance to vote can often weaken the position of the Islamic candidates.

Secondly, women’s membership in representative councils and similar bodies

We are of the view that there is nothing in the Shari’a texts to prevent this either. The views we cited earlier concerning their right to vote applies to their right to be elected as well.

There are some views which are held by others which support the contrary, they say that: 1- Women lack the knowledge of practising public affairs. Hence, they can be easily misled. This argument is refuted by the fact that an ignorant woman is like an ignorant man. Not all women are ignorant and not all men are educated or experienced in public affairs. We are dealing with the basic right, not with the conditions that must be present in every candidate whether they be male or female. This is quite another issue. We call for the education and the enlightenment of both women and men, and the exertion of all possible efforts in this connection, this being an important objective and duty made binding by the Shari’a 2- It is argued that women undergo menstruation, child-bearing and labour -a fact which may hamper their performance in the council to which they are elected. But this can be refuted by saying that men also may be subject to misjudgement or illness which may impair their performance. Add to this, that membership in representative councils has certain conditions including a certain age range for the deputy of between thirty and forty years. In most cases, when a woman is around the age of forty, she will have completed her burdens of child-bearing, and would have attained to a phase of mental and psychological maturity, as well as emotional stability. It is unlikely that a person in the minimum age limit can gain a seat in the representative office because this requires long experience for many years in the exercise of public office. Statistics show that only a few members of representative bodies are in or near the minimum mandatory age. The majority are much older.

We are speaking about the right of standing for membership, we are not dealing with the qualifications necessary for conditions of membership for men and women. It is up to the voters to choose if they see that the female candidate is not in a condition or a state which enables her to perform her duties. It is supposed that they will not support her and that the body patronising her will be reluctant to go on doing so or to field her as candidate.

3- Immodesty and intermingling of the sexes are also cited as counter-arguments. We do not call for immodesty and free mixing of the sexes. For the woman is bound by the Shari’a to abide by the Islamic dress code whether she goes out to take part in elections or to attend the sessions of the council in which she is a member or for any other purpose. It is a duty to set aside election centres for women, which are already in effect in most Islamic countries. Women should be allocated special places in the representative councils so that there will be no fear of crowding or intermingling.

4- Travelling abroad by a female member, without company of a mahram, is similarly cited in opposition but it can be countered by realising that it is not necessary for her to travel without the company of a mahram. She need not be in a situation without secure company nor in any situation which is not within the boundaries of the Shari’ah.

Thirdly, Women’s holding of Public Office

The only public office which it is agreed upon that a woman cannot occupy is the presidency or head of state. As for judiciary office, the jurisprudents have differed over women’s holding of it. Some, like Al-Tabari and Ibn-Hazm, said this is permissible without any restrictions. The majority of jurispudents, however, have forbidden it completely. But there have been those who allowed it for certain types of legal matters and forbade it in others (like the Imam Abu Hanifa). As long as the matter is the subject of interpretation and consideration, it is possible to choose from these opinions in accordance with the fundamentals of the Shari’a and to achieve the interests of Muslims at large as governed by the Shari’a controls and also in accordance to the conditions and circumstances of society. As for other types of public office the woman can accept them as there is nothing in the Shari’a to prevent her from doing so. Also, there is nothing to prevent her from working in what is permissible since the public office is a type of work that the Shari’a allowed women to undertake. Women can work in professions becoming doctors, teachers, nurses, or such fields which she or the society may need.

A GENERAL REMARK

We, The Muslim Brotherhood, wish to draw attention to the need of distinguishing between a person’s having a right and the way, the conditions, and the appropriate circumstances for the use of that right. Thus, if today’s societies have different social circumstances and traditions it is acceptable that the exercise of these rights should be gradually introduced in order for the society to adjust to these circumstances. More importantly, such an exercise should not lead to the violation of ethical rules laid down by the Shari’a and made binding by it.

We completely reject the way that western society has almost completely stripped women of their morality and chastity. These ideals are built upon a philosophy which is in contradiction to the Shari’ah and its morals and values. It is important in our Islamic Society, that the Islamic principles, morals and values are upheld with the fullest conviction, honour and austerity, in obedience to Allah, exalted be He.

And all praise is due to Allah, in the beginning and the end. May the blessings of Allah be upon His Messenger and his companions and his family.

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Mahdi Bray of MAS Freedom is Furious, Written By Steven Emerson